


JPRS-TND-93-002  
15 January 1993



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
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## ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-002

## CONTENTS

15 January 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

### AFRICA

#### SOUTH AFRICA

Russian Offer To Launch Satellites Considered [SUNDAY TIMES 27 Dec] .....	1
ANC Welcomes Start II, Urges RSA Disclosure [SAPA] .....	1
Antinuclear Group Alleges 'Nuclear Link' With Japan [WEEKEND ARGUS 7 Nov] .....	2
Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Explained [ARMED FORCES Nov] .....	2

### CHINA

Iran To Supply MiGs in Exchange for Missile Technology [Tokyo KYODO] .....	3
Qian Qichen Statement on Chemical Weapons [XINHUA] .....	3

### EAST ASIA

#### JAPAN

Tokyo To Curb Arms-Related Exports to Mideast [KYODO] .....	4
Miyazawa Designates Company for Plutonium Production [KYODO] .....	4
Demonstrations Greet Plutonium Ship's Arrival [KYODO] .....	4

#### LAOS

Foreign Ministry Statement on CWs Pact [Vientiane Radio] .....	5
--	---

### MALAYSIA

Demonstrators Protest Japanese Plutonium Transport [Tokyo KYODO] .....	5
--	---

### NORTH KOREA

Suspicion About Nuclear Development Denounced [KCNA] .....	6
Russian Nuclear Scientists' Allegedly Seek Entry .....	6
Scientists Barred From Leaving Moscow [Seoul YONHAP] .....	6
Reports Labeled as 'Rumor' [KCNA] .....	6
Ambassador Denies Nuclear Links With Iran, Iraq [Cairo MENA] .....	7
Japanese 'Nuclear Kidnapping' Worries Denounced [KCNA] .....	7
Japan Criticized for Plutonium Transports [Pyongyang Radio] .....	7
'Development of Nuclear Arms' in South Eyed [KCNA] .....	8

### SOUTH KOREA

Reaction to Japanese Plutonium Shipments .....	8
Government Notes Concern [YONHAP] .....	8
Countermeasures Considered [TONG-A ILBO 6 Jan] .....	8
Foreign Ministry Denies Plutonium Contract With UK [YONHAP] .....	9

## **EAST EUROPE**

### **BULGARIA**

- Council of Ministers Approves CW Ban Convention [BTA] ..... 10

### **HUNGARY**

- Defense Spokesman Speaks on Arms Deal With Russia [Budapest Radio] ..... 10

### **POLAND**

- Rumors of Attempt to Buy Nuclear Weapons Rejected [Warsaw Radio] ..... 10  
Book Alleges Walesa Wanted Ukraine Nuclear Warheads [RZECZPOSPOLITA 8 Jan] ..... 11

### **YUGOSLAVIA**

- Serbian Leader on Availability of Nuclear Weapons [TANJUG] ..... 11  
Serb Commander Says Use of N-Arms 'Not Ruled Out' [Milan PANORAMA 10 Jan] ..... 12

## **LATIN AMERICA**

### **ARGENTINA**

- Condor-2 To Be Shipped to Spain for Dismantling [Madrid ABC 7 Jan] ..... 13

## **NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA**

### **EGYPT**

- Study Explains Arab Position on CWs Treaty [AL-AHRAM 8 Jan] ..... 14  
Egypt, Syria Reiterate Rejection [MENA] ..... 14

### **INDIA**

- Export of Dual-Use Chemicals Regulated [Delhi Radio] ..... 15

### **IRAQ**

- Seven Atomic Scientists Said Executed in Baghdad [Voice of Iraqi Islamic Revolution] ..... 15

### **ISRAEL**

- Charges of Technology Transfer to PRC 'Baseless' [DAVAR 6 Jan] ..... 15

### **PAKISTAN**

- Finance Minister Says Japan To Link Aid, Nuclear Issue [Tokyo KYODO] ..... 15  
Nuclear Installation Lists Exchanged With India [Islamabad Radio] ..... 16  
Excavation for Chinese Nuclear Power Plant Noted [Islamabad TV] ..... 16

## **CENTRAL EURASIA**

### **COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES**

- Gen Ivashov on Control of Strategic N-Arms [Moscow Radio] ..... 17  
Kozyrev on Ukraine, Kazakhstan Nuclear Problems [Moscow TV] ..... 17

## RUSSIA

Reaction to Signing of Start II Treaty With U.S. ....	17
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Comments [ITAR-TASS] .....	17
People's Deputy Astafyev Speaks [ITAR-TASS] .....	18
Deputy Defense Minister on Ramifications [INTERFAX] .....	19
Grachev Voices Support [Moscow Radio] .....	19
Kozyrev Cited on Chemical Weapons Convention [IZVESTIYA 14 Jan] .....	19
Reports Continue on Exporting Dual-Use Materials .....	20
Yeltsin Signs Directive [INTERFAX] .....	20
Customs Orders Chemical Controls [KOMMERSANT 2-8 Nov] .....	21
Academy of Sciences Denies 'Brain Drain' to PRC [ITAR-TASS] .....	23
Stolen Uranium Seized From Arzamas-16 Inhabitants [MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 3 Jan] .....	23
Severodvinsk Atomic Shipbuilding Center Set Up [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 25 Dec] .....	23

## ARMENIA

Official Denies Radiological Weapon Report [TRUD 29 Dec] .....	23
--	----

## BELARUS

Reaction to Russian-U.S. Start II Treaty Noted .....	24
Kravchenko Welcomes Signing [ITAR-TASS] .....	24
Supreme Soviet Chairman Comments [Minsk Radio] .....	24

## UKRAINE

Reaction to Russian-U.S. Start II, Disarmament .....	24
Kravchuk Statement [Kiev Radio] .....	24
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments [INTERFAX] .....	25
Officers Union Opposes Moscow Control [Kiev Radio] .....	25
Nuclear Disarmament Problems Eyed [HOLOS UKRAYINY 22 Dec] .....	25
Defense Ministry Views Draft Accord [Kiev Radio] .....	27
Conditions Stated for Ratifying START I [Moscow Radio] .....	27
Kravchuk Creates Nuclear Policy Commission [HOLOS UKRAYINY 6 Jan] .....	27
Defense Ministry Says All Tactical N-Arms Withdrawn [Kiev Radio] .....	27
Deputy Foreign Minister Calls COCOM 'Discrimination' [KYYIVSKA PRAVDA 8 Dec] .....	27
Black Sea Nuclear-Free Zone Proposed at UN [Kiev Radio] .....	28
Nuclear Charges To Be Converted Into Fuel [Kiev TV] .....	28
Dismissals Follow Nuclear Waste Storage Violations [INTERFAX] .....	28

## WEST EUROPE

### GERMANY

Kinkel Hails Signing of CW Convention [DDP] .....	29
Study Conducted on Combatting Nuclear Proliferation [FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 12 Jan] .....	29



## SOUTH AFRICA

### Russian Offer To Launch Satellites Considered

MB2712104492 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES  
in English 27 Dec 92 p 1

[By Brian Pottinger and Charis Perkins: "Russia Joins SA Space Bid"]

[Text] Russia has offered to put South African satellites into space using its redundant nuclear missiles—at a fraction of the cost of developing locally made missiles.

The extraordinary offer from Moscow's Scientific and Technological Centre will come as a shock to South Africa's high-tech industries, which are investigating a multi-billion investment in a home-grown space industry.

The Russians are offering to put as many as nine low-orbit satellites in space with the use of one missile at a cost R[and]25-million—negotiable.

Meanwhile, Denel, the commercialised arm of Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], is studying the feasibility of ploughing at least R5-billion into its own space development programme in the next few years.

Russia's bargain-basement offer is a major threat to the armaments industry, which is battling to find a new niche after the winding down of the border war.

Details of the Russian offer have been made public by Dr Rudolf Gruber, the SA Foundation's Bonn representative, who discussed the possibilities with Professor Y. Solomonov, chief designer of the SS-20 intercontinental missile, in July.

According to the proposal, the satellites could be launched from near the Russian city of Murmansk or could even sent into space by use of SS-20's brought to South Africa.

The launching ramps could be erected on an area the size of a rugby field and then shipped back to Russia once the launch was completed.

The Russians are also offering to provide a complete multi-purpose space system which would provide satellites for communications and meteorological surveys—again at a fraction of the estimated cost of developing satellites in South Africa.

Dr. Gruber said this week his sole interest in approaching the SA Government with the Russian proposal was to be of service to South Africa.

Mr. Paul Holzhausen, executive corporate communications spokesman for Denel, said this week that no formal offer had yet been received.

He said that feasibility studies for a South African space industry was pushing ahead, but he could not confirm that the cost would be R5-billion.

"We are busy looking into Denel's capabilities. We have also approached foreign and local businesses who may be interested in becoming involved, and are offering our satellites as a service to other African countries."

Somchem, a division of Denel, is developing locally made rocket motors and has already tested three motors this year. Houtech, also a division of Denel, has a well-advanced satellite programme.

The Russian offer comes at a delicate moment in negotiations between the SA and US governments.

The US wants to limit the number of countries who acquire the technology to launch inter-continental missiles and has threatened South Africa with punitive steps if it proceeds.

Foreign Affairs spokesman Dieter Petzch said the government was eager to develop a commercially viable space programme without alienating the Americans.

An American source close to the negotiations said the cost of developing the missile and satellite system could be as much as R20-billion.

### ANC Welcomes Start II, Urges RSA Disclosure

MB0501054493 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1958 GMT 4 Jan 93

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by: African National Congress]

[Text] African National Congress [ANC]

Department of Information and Publicity ANC welcomes START 2 and insists that South Africa must declare its own nuclear activities and ambitions

The African National Congress warmly welcomes the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start 2) signed yesterday between Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, scrapping 17,000 nuclear weapons. We support every step that will reduce the nuclear weapons threat and create a more secure world.

The Start 2 treaty is a reminder seriously addressing South Africa's active and secret nuclear development programme. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has determined that South Africa secretly produced several hundred kilograms of high enriched uranium (HEU).

It is disturbing that South African officials have stated that they are not compelled to disclose any information about their nuclear development programme prior to signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The ANC is deeply concerned that South Africa could still be involved in secretive nuclear activities at a time when major strides are made throughout the world to reduce nuclear weapons. This situation calls for the urgent attention of the international community. The De Klerk government and the AEC [Atomic Energy Corporation] must immediately reveal the nuclear programme past and present.

The ANC has long been opposed to the militarism of the apartheid regime and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. We believe that secret control of nuclear facilities, of undeclared stocks of weapons grade material, and possibly nuclear weapons by the minority regime and its military and intelligence agencies holds serious dangers for the people of our country and the whole southern African region.

Adherence to the NPT requires full cooperation by South Africa and all other countries. In particular, we cannot allow our country to exclude some of its nuclear processing facilities and their complete records from inspection by the IAEA.

The control of all South Africa's nuclear facilities is a matter which should receive early attention from transitional and interim government. Issued by: the Department of Information and Publicity  
P.O. Box 61884  
Marshalltown  
2107 4 January 1993

**Antinuclear Group Alleges 'Nuclear Link' With Japan**  
*93WP0060A Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS*  
*in English 7 Nov 92 p 11*

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] South Africa has a vested interest in boosting the Japanese nuclear industry and thus cannot protest vigorously against Japan's plutonium shipments here, the Coalition Against Plutonium Shipments (Caps) says in a statement.

The coalition said South Africa, a big supplier of uranium, was closely connected to the international nuclear industry.

South African uranium was burnt in Japanese nuclear reactors and the waste reprocessed to plutonium, the statement said.

"South Africa therefore has a direct interest in ensuring the further development of the Japanese nuclear industry," said Caps spokesman Professor Thomas Auf der Heyde.

He said the government had initially created the impression that the Japanese should stay out of the South African Exclusive Fishing Zone, 200 nautical miles.

But it then back-tracked to say that as long as the ship kept outside territorial waters, 12 nautical miles, there would be no need to take any steps.

The Department of Environmental Affairs launched a liaison committee on September 21 concerning across-the-border transport of hazardous materials. But all committee members were from government departments or bodies, except for Portnet.

Professor Auf der Heyde said: "This attitude flies in the face of the accepted principle that the public should be fully consulted about environmental issues."

**Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Explained**  
*93WP0063A Johannesburg ARMED FORCES*  
*in English Nov 92 p 25*

[Text] The following is the text of a statement released by the South African Department of foreign affairs.

The cabinet has decided that South Africa will become an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A South African delegation will be present at the official signing ceremony in Paris from 13 to 15 January 1993. The South African delegation will be headed by Minister R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa.

In the signing of the treaty South Africa which was one of the two, major producers of chemical weapons, if not the major, for the Allies during WWII has undertaken not to use its previous capabilities for any future production of these types of weapons.

During WWII over 2,000 men were employed in two South African factories, one at Firgrove in the Cape and the other at Klipfontein near Kempton Park to produce mustard gas. Working on behalf of the British Ministry of Supply and in conjunction with the Witwatersrand University the plants were able to produce 10 tons of the gas per day. The stocks of gas were held in storage at Port Elizabeth and were dumped at sea after the war. Both plants closed down during the end of the war and converted to the manufacture of DDT and BHC.

On 9 January 1989, at the Paris Chemical Weapons Conference for States party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. R.F. Botha, expressed South Africa's support for negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. He said that chemical technology and the conduct of warfare had both been transformed since the adoption of the Geneva Protocol. It was thus not surprising that suggestions had been made that a truly international convention banning the use of chemical weapons was sorely needed. He commented: "To be effective, such a Convention would need to be comprehensive, global and verifiable."

South Africa is fully aware of its regional and global responsibilities of which non-proliferation and disarmament are important facets. A country's desire to contribute to global peace and security is evidenced, amongst other steps, by its adherence to multilateral treaties, conventions and protocols in the field of security and the control of weapons of mass destruction. Increasing international concern about the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has resulted in various non-proliferation regimes coming into existence. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, are defined as weapons of mass destruction.

South Africa acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 10 July 1991 and, two months later, on 16 September 1991, concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These steps illustrate South Africa's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and underscore the South African Government's desire to contribute the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free-zone in Southern Africa.

Furthermore, South Africa already adheres to the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). As far as national non-proliferation control measures are concerned, a Draft Bill on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was recently published in the Government Gazette. The Bill will probably be tabled in Parliament next year.

**Iran To Supply MiGs in Exchange for Missile Technology**

*OW0801113093 Tokyo KYODO in English 1055 GMT 8 Jan 93*

[Text] Beijing, Jan. 8 KYODO—China is buying an unknown number of Soviet-made MiG-29 fighters from Iran to help Beijing develop a modernized version of its outdated Jian-7 fighter, Western diplomatic sources said Friday [8 January].

The aircraft in question belongs to a batch of 115 MiG-29 fighters and 33 civilian aircraft the Iraqi Government transferred to Iran during the August 1990 to February 1991 Persian Gulf war to save them from attacks by the U.S.-led allied forces.

Iran later refused to return the planes and confiscated them as compensation for war damage suffered in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.

According to the sources, Iran and China reportedly reached an agreement on the planes at the end of last year.

The sources said Iran delivered some of the MiG-29 fighter aircraft already in 1992. In exchange, China will provide Iran with missile technology and a nuclear power station, they said.

China reportedly has problems with the engines of its Jian-7 fighter, a China-made copy of the former Soviet Union's MiG-21.

Beijing, therefore, plans to use the MiG-29 engines to produce a modernized version and to narrow the technological gap between its own fighter program developed in the 1960's and Russian and U.S. advanced combat aircraft, the sources said.

China's original plans to purchase fighter engines and advanced electronic technology in the U.S. were stymied when Washington froze relations in the aftermath of Beijing's military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in June 1989.

In addition to the agreement with Iran, China is currently negotiating with Russia the purchase of about 90 MiG-29 engines, the sources said.

The development of a modernized Jian 7 version has reached its final stage and is close to quantity production, they said.

**Qian Qichen Statement on Chemical Weapons**

*OW1401034593 Beijing XINHUA in English 0337 GMT 14 Jan 93*

[Text] Paris, January 13 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signed the convention on prohibition of chemical weapons with other 125 countries in Paris today.

After signing the document, Qian, also state councillor, presented a Chinese Government statement to U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

The statement said, "China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities. The convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction constitutes the legal basis for the realization of this goal. Therefore, China supports the object, purpose and principles of the convention."

"The object, purpose and principles of the convention should be strictly abided by," the statement stressed.

The negotiations on the convention began in the 1960's. Last December, the 47th U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution on starting to sign the convention on January 13.

China has taken part in the negotiations since 1980 and made constructive contribution to reaching the convention.

The signing meeting will end on Friday [15 January] and the document will then remain open for signature in New York.

## JAPAN

**Tokyo To Curb Arms-Related Exports to Mideast***OW2112111192 Tokyo KYODO in English 1056 GMT  
21 Dec 92*

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 21 KYODO—Japan will regulate exports of materials that could be used in the production of conventional weapons to Iran, Iraq, and Libya effective January 20, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials said Monday [21 December]. The move is in line with an agreement among the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial nations to effectively ban exports of such materials to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, the officials said.

Japan bans export of such materials to North Korea in accordance with the Coordinating Committee for Export Control (Cocom) rules, and has long banned exports of weapons, they said.

The government will revise related decrees necessary for the ban on the exports to the three countries. The revised decrees are scheduled to be officially announced next Monday and come into effect January 20, the officials said. Under the revised decrees, exports to the three countries of some 200 items in three sectors—weapons, atomic energy, and machinery for civil industries—will be subject to approval by MITI, they said. Among the items are uranium-related substances, computers, and machine tools, the officials said.

In the case where there is a possibility that the materials for civil purposes could also be used for military purposes, exports of the materials will be banned, they said.

**Miyazawa Designates Company for Plutonium Production***OW2412024092 Tokyo KYODO in English 0140 GMT  
24 Dec 92*

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 24 KYODO—Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa on Thursday [24 December] formally designated Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. as an operator for a facility to produce plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, government officials said.

Construction of the plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, northern Japan, will begin in March next year and it is expected to begin operating in January 2000, the officials said.

The plutonium to be produced will be used in Japan's fast breeder reactor program, according to previously announced government plans.

The company is scheduled to start keeping spent nuclear fuel in storage from April 1996, the spokesman said.

The Rokkasho facility is one of the world's largest nuclear reprocessing plants and will produce some five tons of plutonium by reprocessing 800 tons of spent nuclear fuel every year, the spokesman said.

The 380-square-meter complex, being built as part of Japan's program to meet future energy needs, consists of three key facilities—a uranium enrichment plant, a low-level nuclear waste storage center and the reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel.

The reprocessing plant will handle spent nuclear fuel from power plants throughout Japan to recover plutonium and usable uranium.

**Demonstrations Greet Plutonium Ship's Arrival***OW0501062893 Tokyo KYODO in English 0414 GMT  
5 Jan 93*

[Text] Tokai, Ibaraki Pref., Jan. 5 KYODO—A Japanese ship loaded with a cargo of plutonium from Europe for use in a prototype fast-breeder reactor was greeted with demonstrations on its arrival at Tokai port 140 kilometers northeast of Tokyo on Tuesday morning.

About 500 antinuclear activists and labor union members staged demonstrations near the harbor against the unloading of 15 containers containing a ton of reprocessed plutonium.

Demonstrators held dozens of banners reading "We don't need plutonium" and chanted slogans while beating drums. The international environmentalist organization Greenpeace flew an advertisement balloon from the chartered yacht *Exstasea A* anchored near the port.

The Akatsuki Maru, which has a gross tonnage of 4,800 tons, was returning from its 32,000 kilometer-long voyage 134 days after it left Yokohama port for Cherbourg in France in late August.

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa welcomed the vessel's safe arrival. "We are glad that (the ship) returned without an accident. We also have to thank the French and the U.S. Governments for their support," he told a group of reporters at his official residence.

The Akatsuki Maru's crew was welcomed by several officials but they refrained from staging an official ceremony to avoid arousing further controversy.

After the plutonium ship docked at Tokai port, the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), which deployed some 69 boats and five helicopters to maintain security, sealed off the port's entrance with a barrier to keep out Greenpeace vessels that tried to approach the Akatsuki Maru during its entry.

Police mobilized about 1,000 officers to patrol Tokai port, the exclusive harbor of Japan Nuclear Power Co. (JNP), a state-owned company handling Japan's plutonium supply, and the surrounding area.

After strict security checks, some 200 of the 361 journalists covering the event were allowed entry to the JNP's nearby fuel manufacturing plant, where the controversial cargo will be taken.



Workers started unloading the 15 gray containers holding the plutonium packed in 130 sealed casks. Their transport to the JNP facility two kilometers away on specially designed trailers is expected to start Tuesday afternoon.

If the transfer of the plutonium casks is not finished by sunset, the work will be suspended for the night and resumed Wednesday morning due to the lack of night lighting at the port.

The Akatsuki Maru's cargo is the first of about 30 tons of plutonium scheduled for transport to Japan from Europe in the next decade as Japan will not have its own commercial reprocessing facilities before the year 2000.

This first shipment of plutonium is destined for use in the test fast-breeder reactor Monju in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, on the Sea of Japan coast, expected to reach its critical stage in the fall, about six months later than originally scheduled.

The schedules and routes for future plutonium shipments from Europe to Japan will be kept secret to prevent hijackings at sea despite heavy criticism by environmentalists and concerned citizens.

Before the voyage, many countries voiced concerns over the route since their territorial waters might have been affected if the plutonium had leaked.

Greenpeace monitored the Akatsuki Maru, which was escorted during its return voyage by the MSA patrol vessel Shikishima, for much of its journey south from France via the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa.

The ship is known to have then sailed south of Australia and veered north to traverse the Tasman Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

JNP had said it would release hitherto secret information on the ship's route after its arrival.

## LAOS

### Foreign Ministry Statement on CWs Pact

BK1301030893 Vientiane Vitthayou Hengsat Radio  
Network in Lao 0000 GMT 13 Jan 93

["Statement" of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on the UN signing of the treaty on the prohibition of production, stockpiling, and the use and destruction of chemical weapons, in Paris—13 January 1993]

[Text] On 13 January 1993 in Paris, France, the United Nations with the cooperation of the French Government will hold a ceremony to sign a treaty on the prohibition of production, stockpiling, and the use and destruction of chemical weapons.

The government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] wholeheartedly welcomes and hails

this important event. As a full member of the United Nations, the LPDR always regards the reduction of all types of arms, especially weapons of mass-destruction including chemical weapons, as an important development and a fundamental condition for safeguarding and building peace and mutual trust in international relations. The signing of the treaty on the prohibition of production, stockpiling, and the use and destruction of chemical weapons marks a historical effort of the international community, aimed at gradually destroying and eliminating chemical weapons from the world. In this spirit, the LPDR Government officially reaffirms its stand that in the past as well as in the present, we have never had any chemical weapons in our possession nor have we ever used such dangerous arsenal. Due to difficulties in some regulations, the LPDR Government regrets that it is unable to attend the signing ceremony of the treaty in Paris. Nonetheless, we are currently speeding up the resolution of certain regulations so that we are able to become a signatory of the treaty in the future.

## MALAYSIA

### Demonstrators Protest Japanese Plutonium Transport

OW2112104692 Tokyo KYODO in English 0859 GMT  
21 Dec 92

[Excerpt] Kuala Lumpur, Dec. 21 KYODO—About a dozen protesters held a brief demonstration Monday outside the Japanese Embassy against Japan's nuclear energy program for its use of highly toxic plutonium.

The group called on Japan to respect the rights of others to a safe environment, reconsider its nuclear policy, and support a global ban on plutonium production and usage.

The protesters demonstrated for about 30 minutes before handing over a protest note to an embassy official.

In a two-page memorandum, they voiced concern about the dangers posed by the Akatsuki Maru freighter, which is on a return journey home from France carrying just about one ton of processed plutonium for Japan's fast-breeder reactor program.

They said Japan's plan to ship home about 30 tons of processed plutonium over the next 20 years can be perceived as a first step toward nuclear weapons capability.

They also urged Japan to reduce its nuclear energy program and conduct research into safer sources of energy. [passage omitted]

**NORTH KOREA****Suspicious About Nuclear Development Denounced***SK2512043692 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0409 GMT 25 Dec 92*

["NODONG SINMUN on U.S. Imperialists' Outcries Over 'Nuclear Arms Development'"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang December 25 (KCNA)—The outcries of the United States and the South Korean authorities over "nuclear suspicion" against the DPRK are aimed at concealing the U.S. moves to keep South Korea as its nuclear base and South Korea's nuclear armament, diverting elsewhere the attention of the world people and realising their sinister intention to unleash a nuclear war.

In a signed commentary entitled "Black and White Become Clearer" NODONG SINMUN today says:

A majority of the world population do not have any doubt about our peaceful nuclear policy but sympathize with its honesty. Even the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said he had no information about the manufacture of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang.

Only the United States, the South Korean authorities and other seditious forces are making much ado, branding our peaceful nuclear policy as "doubtful."

It is not we but the United States and the South Korean authorities that block the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and pose a nuclear threat.

The U.S. President's statement that tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from South Korea and the South Korean chief executive's "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" were all sheer lies. U.S. nuclear weapons are still hidden in underground secret arsenals and U.S. nuclear submarines frequent naval bases of South Korea. It has been brought to light recently that the South Korean authorities, at the instigation of the United States, have long since promoted the development of nuclear weapons.

Their outcries over "development of nuclear arms" by the DPRK remind us of a thief crying "stop thief."

The United States and the South Korean authorities must frankly admit and apologize for their criminal acts.

**Russian Nuclear Scientists' Allegedly Seek Entry****Scientists Barred From Leaving Moscow***SK2112124492 Seoul YONHAP in English 1231 GMT  
21 Dec 92*

[Text] Moscow, Dec. 21 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Embassy here in Moscow is contacting Russian authorities to find out the truth behind at least two groups of Russian nuclear physicists seeking to fly to North Korea in the past two months.

A senior embassy official said Monday that in addition to the 36 Russian nuclear scientists prevented from leaving Russia for North Korea recently as reported by THE SUNDAY TIMES of Great Britain, about 10 nuclear physicists were caught trying to fly to Pyongyang last October.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev notified Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok about the October incident during his visit to Seoul last November when he was accompanying President Boris Yeltsin.

"As he revealed the incident, Kozyrev vowed before Minister Yi that Russia would not furnish any nuclear development knowhow to North Korea," the embassy official said.

He added that the October incident involving about 10 nuclear scientists was definitely separate from the latest attempt by the 36 nuclear physicists reported by THE SUNDAY TIMES.

**Reports Labeled as 'Rumor'***SK2512110692 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1054 GMT 25 Dec 92*

[Text] Pyongyang December 25 (KCNA)—Media of Britain and some other Western countries and South Korea a few days ago spread the rumor that Russian nuclear experts were arrested while attempting to defect to the northern half of Korea.

As a spokesman for the Russian Security Ministry dismissed this report as incorrect, it is totally unfounded. Spreading an incoherent rumor is another intrigue to provoke the peaceloving DPRK.

They resorted to such intrigues as the justice of the DPRK's peaceful nuclear policy has been proved all the more clearly, while the U.S. and South Korean authorities' nuclear war moves and shameless anti-DPRK campaign have been brought to full light.

They contrived such black propaganda in a bid to justify the U.S. policy of keeping South Korea as a nuclear base and the South Korean authorities' development of nuclear weapons. It is a habitual practice of the United States and the South Korean authorities to groundlessly take issue with others each time they find themselves in a fix and the afore-said rumor is a link in the chain of their foolish attempts to do harm to the DPRK.

The world's progressive people who love justice and peace will never be taken in by the imperialists and the South Korean authorities' intrigues and deception.

Those who try to find a way out of their difficult position in plot-breeding and fabrication are bound to face fiercer condemnation and rejection from the unbiased public opinion of the world.

**Ambassador Denies Nuclear Links With Iran, Iraq**

NC0701194993 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1719 GMT  
7 Jan 93

[Excerpts] Cairo, 7 Jan (MENA)—DPRK Ambassador to Egypt Kim Yong-sop has disclosed that President Husni Mubarak will visit the DPRK in early spring as part of an Asian tour. This came in a news conference Kim held at the DPRK Embassy today. [passage omitted]

Asked about reports that the DPRK is exporting nuclear technology to Iran and Iraq, the Korean ambassador said that these reports are groundless. Such lies, he said, aim to isolate the DPRK, impose sanctions on it, and justify the continued presence of U.S. troops in the ROK.

The ambassador said that the DPRK is not a nuclear country and cannot transfer nuclear technology. He added that such a transfer would conflict with the DPRK's humanitarian principles. We uphold the treaties on nuclear safeguards and have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, he stated. [passage omitted]

**Japanese 'Nuclear Kidnapping' Worries Denounced**

SK0801045793 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0418 GMT 8 Jan 93

[Text] Tokyo January 6 (KNS-KCNA)—A high-placed official of the Japanese Government let loose rude utterances on January 5 to mislead public opinion by expressing "worries about nuclear kidnapping by North Korea" in plutonium transport.

Ho Chong-man, vice-chairman of the Central Standing Committee of the General Association of Korean residents in Japan (Chongnyon), in a statement on January 6 said that this is obviously intended to divert elsewhere the criticism and denunciation at home and abroad invited by the danger of Japan's scheme to stockpile large quantities of plutonium and conceal its intention of nuclear armament by slandering the innocent Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

He went on to say:

The outburst of the ranking official of the Japanese Government was to evade its responsibility for the nuclear suspicion and it showed that the Japanese Government was still resorting to an open hostile policy against the DPRK.

We strongly protest and denounce his rude remarks, branding them as a vicious challenge to the DPRK which keeps to a denuclearization, peace line and an insult to our national dignity.

Japan, while intending to transport more plutonium in the future, raises outcries over the "suspicion of nuclear

development" by the DPRK and "worries about nuclear kidnapping." This is dastardly and preposterous utterances.

It is well known a fact that the DPRK has hitherto declared repeatedly that it had no intention to manufacture nuclear weapons and energetically pushed ahead with a policy of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

We strongly demand that the Japanese Government authorities immediately retract and apologize for the slanderous utterances against the DPRK which were intended to evade international criticism and suspicion against them.

**Japan Criticized for Plutonium Transports**

SK0801235593 Pyongyang Korean Central  
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2220 GMT 8 Jan 93

[Statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on 8 January]

[Text] A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued the following statement on 8 January on the arrival in Japan of the Japanese ship, "Akatsuki-Maru." The ship is loaded with a large amount of plutonium.

Statement by the spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry:

According to a foreign news report, on 5 January, the Japanese ship, "Akatsuki-Maru," arrived in Japan's Tokai port from France loaded with 1.7 tons of plutonium. The transport of plutonium by Japan encountered opposition and denunciation from many countries, including countries along the coast of its transport route because of its danger.

Regardless of great international apprehension and strong denunciation, the Japanese authorities forced the sea transport of plutonium. This is an intolerable challenge to the world's people who oppose nuclear weapons and desire peace. It is a threat to world peace. This shows that Japan's maneuver to arm itself with nuclear weapons has reached a very grave stage.

The Japanese authorities dragged in and stockpiled by adventurous means a large amount of plutonium, enough to make hundreds of atomic bombs. This is a new threat to peace and security in Asia. Moreover, since we are near Japan and have been a direct victim of the Japanese imperialists' aggression, we cannot but deal with this in a very serious way.

Especially, what must not be overlooked is that when the ship, "Akatsuki-Maru," arrived in Japan, the Japanese authorities—like a thief crying stop thief—had the impudence to say that someone may be able to snatch this nuclear material and so on. They groundlessly found fault with us. This fully revealed the true intention of the Japanese authorities to continue to drag in plutonium

under every conceivable pretext so that they can arm themselves with nuclear weapons, and become a nuclear power without fail.

This also proves that the Japanese authorities have persistently found fault with us by saying that there exists the possibility of nuclear arms development and a nuclear development program. This is nothing but a deceitful trick to turn the world's attention elsewhere. It is an attempt to cover up their ambition to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

The Japanese Government should no longer carry out this kind of despicable act. It should stop the reckless maneuver of arming itself of nuclear weapons which runs counter to the unanimous demand and desire of the world's peace-loving people.

### **'Development of Nuclear Arms' in South Eyed**

*SK2112105492 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1007 GMT 21 Dec 92*

["Nature of Nuclear War Maniacs Cannot Be Concealed"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang December 21 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comes out with an article on the development of nuclear arms in South Korea which was exposed recently by the Central Committee of the National Democratic Front of South Korea.

The successive rulers of South Korea have promoted nuclear armament over the past two decades in secrecy, regarding it as a means to realize their wild ambition for "unification by prevailing over communism" with the backing of the U.S. imperialists. The nuclear armament has reached a very dangerous stage today, the article notes, and continues:

There are active in South Korea special technical groups for the development of nuclear arms including the "Institute of Defence Science" specialized in the designing of nuclear bombs and the development of ballistic missiles.

The South Korean authorities have already produced or imported and stockpiled in secrecy no small amount of high enriched uranium and plutonium for the manufacture of nuclear bombs.

Ten tons of plutonium can be extracted from the raw material stockpiled for the manufacture of nuclear bombs in South Korea. The amount is enough to manufacture 1,500 Nagasaki-type nuclear bombs.

The South Korean authorities can import high technology for the manufacture of nuclear bombs from the United States and promote in real earnest the home production of nuclear vehicles.

The fact shows that it is an urgent matter on the Korean peninsula to check the nuclear armament of South Korea.

The "suspicion of nuclear arms development" raised by the South Korean authorities against the North while developing nuclear arms and staging nuclear war exercises is a smoke-screen to conceal the U.S. moves to make South Korea a forward nuclear base and the nuclear armament of South Korea and a pretext to justify the nuclear war exercises.

It is obvious that the United States and the South Korean rulers intend to ignite a war against the North while making a fuss over "suspicion" and "delay."

The South Korean authorities must apologize to the nation for their criminal promotion of nuclear arms development, immediately stop it, accept our demand for overall inspection at once and take to the line of denuclearizing South Korea.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

### **Reaction to Japanese Plutonium Shipments**

#### **Government Notes Concern**

*SK0501110293 Seoul YONHAP in English 1053 GMT  
5 Jan 93*

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 5 (YONHAP)—The government expressed concern Tuesday over safety of the large amount of plutonium Japan has been introducing.

"The government is concerned about the plutonium in terms of its safe management as such danger exists as hijacking during its transportation," a Foreign Ministry official said.

The official ruled out any possibility of Japan arming itself nuclearly, however.

In view of the international reliance Japan has piled up in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy, he said, it is not likely Japan will be nuclearly armed at least at the present stage.

#### **Countermeasures Considered**

*SK0601120893 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
6 Jan 93 p 1*

[Text] In connection with the recent Japanese moves to import a large quantity of plutonium from Europe and push ahead with a plan to build the world's largest nuclear reprocessing facilities, the government has concluded that Japan now has full capability to develop nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the government is considering medium- and long-term measures to guard against Japan's becoming a major nuclear power.

The government is planning to upgrade the function of the channels of dialogue between the two countries, such as the ROK-Japan nuclear energy meeting to be held in Seoul on 16 January. At the same time, the government is planning to activate the exchange of information on nuclear matters, thereby strengthening the checks and



balances. On a long-term basis, the government is planning to push ahead with a permanent channel of dialogue among the countries in the region to ensure the peaceful use of the Japanese nuclear technology.

In a secret report the Ministry of Science and Technology prepared based on such data as the informational reports sent by the ROK Embassy in Japan since September last year, the government noted: Japan has pushed ahead with a long-term plan for the development and use of nuclear energy since 1956 and accumulated nuclear technology. According to our analysis, Japan reached the technological standard necessary for the development of nuclear weapons as early as 1980.

In this report the government stated: Although Japan claims officially that the objective of its nuclear policy is to secure a stable and continuous energy supply, the Japanese nuclear policy must also be aimed at strengthening its position in defense and security diplomacy as a potential major nuclear power capable of producing nuclear weapons.

The government noted, however: Since Japan has been sincerely receiving nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and maintains the clear three-point nonnuclear principles externally, there is little possibility that Japan will attempt to arm itself with nuclear weapons at present. Therefore, it is a desirable approach for the countries concerned, including the ROK, to activate the exchange of nuclear-related information with Japan for the purpose of checking Japan's potential nuclear development and for the fringe benefit of learning Japan's developed nuclear energy technology.

Meanwhile, Chong Tae-ik, director of the Americas Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: We understand that Japan is planning to bring 30 tons of plutonium from Europe with the objective of stockpiling 85 tons of plutonium from various regions, including Europe, by 2010. The government is concerned about the safety of bringing plutonium by sea, but according to our government's judgment, Japan is unlikely to attempt to arm itself with nuclear weapons.

#### **Foreign Ministry Denies Plutonium Contract With UK**

*SK1101030993 Seoul YONHAP in English 0214 GMT 11 Jan 93*

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 11 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea denied Monday that it had ever sought a plutonium-extracting contract with Britain.

THE NEW YORK TIMES reported Sunday that Korea and Britain had sought the contract since 1991, but did not say if it was ever concluded.

The newspaper's report was totally groundless, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said, adding that Korea "does not plan to seek such a contract in the future either."

"Both countries signed an accord on the peaceful use of atomic power in 1991, but the pact doesn't include a clause on plutonium extraction," he said.

Korea imports uranium from the United States and Canada for its reactors and would need their approval to sign a contract on plutonium extraction with a third country using the uranium, he said.

**BULGARIA****Council of Ministers Approves CW Ban Convention***AU0701205993 Sofia BTA in English 1943 GMT  
7 Jan 93*

[Text] Sofia, January 7 (BTA)—The Council of Ministers today approved the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was adopted by a resolution of the UN General Assembly of November 30, 1992 co-sponsored by Bulgaria.

It was decided that Prof. Lyuben Berov, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, will sign this important document for Bulgaria.

Bulgaria does not develop, produce or possess chemical weapons. No chemical weapons possessed or controlled by any other state are deployed on Bulgarian territory.

**HUNGARY****Defense Spokesman Speaks on Arms Deal With Russia***LD1101144393 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network  
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 11 Jan 93*

[Interview with Defense Ministry spokesman Lajos Erdelyi by Krisztina Antalffy; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Last week several newspapers wrote that Russia will partly pay off the former Soviet debt of \$800 million by delivering military equipment—not only parts, but MiG-29 planes, too. Specifically, they say that such combat aircraft will be supplied to Hungary. The papers are now saying that even complete weapons systems will be delivered. Is this a change from the original idea? Krisztina Antalffy asked Defense Ministry spokesman Lajos Erdelyi to comment.

[Erdelyi] It was said earlier, too, that in return for the debt of \$800 million Russia will deliver military equipment. This includes parts as well as some instruments. As to your question about what specific instruments are involved, the ministry has not yet said anything and does not wish to say anything, because the talks are in the initial stages. There have been talks between experts; one round has taken place so far, and they will continue in the near future. This is not a question of us building up our armaments. The point is simply that we have to maintain the level of our military equipment, which is in a rather poor state.

[Antalffy] Certain newspapers even seem to know that we, for instance, will buy 26 advanced MiG-29 fighter planes.

[Erdelyi] I think this is just guessing, referring to well-informed sources. I can only repeat that the talks are not in a phase that we can talk about facts here.

[Antalffy] So it is not that you do not want to speak, but you cannot speak as yet?

[Erdelyi] On the one hand we cannot speak, and on the other hand it would be irresponsible. At least as irresponsible as publishing these figures and details.

[Antalffy] How will it affect this year's Defense Ministry budget if this equipment worth \$800 million arrives in the country? Parliament has already determined this budget.

[Erdelyi] This sum is not yet in the budget, nor could it be. It has to be made clear that we are not talking about money, but about trade debt. On the other hand, it is far from certain that it will be realized or fully realized in 1993. In addition, if it has an effect on the budget, the government or the ministry will act according to the laws that apply here.

[Antalffy] There are also reports that arms are being bought not just from Russia but from Sweden and other countries, too.

[Erdelyi] These news reports almost fall into the same category as the previous accurate figures and types. It is simply information gathering. We are not talking with the Swedes or the Americans on arms purchases. We are talking simply about two things, on the one hand the German parts supply, and on the other the possibilities of obtaining Russian military equipment. These are two things are definite. Everything else is speculation.

**POLAND****Rumors of Attempt to Buy Nuclear Weapons Rejected***LD0701162893 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network  
in Polish 0300 GMT 7 Jan 93*

[Text] National Defense Ministry spokesman Leszek Ziolo denied rumors spread by the former head of this ministry, Jan Parys, who suggested in NOWY SWIAT daily that the Belweder [Presidential Palace] pushed for illegal purchases of nuclear weapons from the disintegrating Soviet Union. Polish defense policy has always been aimed at nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, Colonel Ziolo said.

The present's spokesman, Andrzej Drzycimski, said that if Parys has information about the Belweder's influence on purchases of nuclear weapons then he should talk to a prosecutor.

### **Book Alleges Walesa Wanted Ukraine Nuclear Warheads**

AU1201145293 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
8 Jan 93 p 2

[Report by Ewa K. Czackowska: "June Frauds, Or Goodbye To A Myth"]

[Text] Mieczyslaw Wachowski a Security Service agent, Lech Walesa wanting to buy nuclear warheads from Ukraine—these are some of the revelations in the latest book by Jacek Kurski and Piotr Semka called *June Frauds* [*Lewy Czerwcowy*] published by Editions Spotkania. Presidential Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski says that there is no documentary evidence for the material presented in the book.

A promotional meeting for the book was held at the headquarters of the Christian-Democratic Labor Party on Thursday [7 January], attended by four of the men who are interviewed in it: Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Antoni Macierewicz, Jan Parys, and Adam Glapinski. Only Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas was missing. These are people who have held important state posts within the past two years. The authors describe them as personifications of the end of the Walesa myth.

The leading idea in the book is that Walesa has betrayed the program he pursued before he became president, as well as the people who voted for him. As evidence of this, the authors interview people who until very recently held influential state posts and who describe "dangers in five spheres that are crucial to Polish sovereignty—the democratic order, the army, the economy, foreign policy, and internal security." The authors say in their foreword that in all these five spheres, any changes implemented by the interviewees were opposed by the Belvedere.

*June Frauds* contains several pieces of sensationalism. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, until November 1991 chairman of the Presidential Chancellery, officially states for the first time that Mieczyslaw Wachowski, the present chief of the Chancellery, was a Security Service agent and that from January to August 1975 he attended an officers course at the Academy of Internal Affairs in Swider, near Otwock, in the company of men from the Citizens Militia and Security Service. Kaczynski provides biographical information on the course leaders and students. What is more, he claims that Walesa has admitted to him that Wachowski was an agent.

During a promotion, Kaczynski said that he does not fear a libel action against him. "I must have something more up my sleeve if I am taken to court," he said.

In the book, Kaczynski also relates several interesting, though controversial, ideas. For example, he says that the authorities were behind the strikes in 1988, and actually started them. The purpose of this was to enforce changes and eliminate Solidarity. He says that Lech Walesa himself was involved in this process, and that he "deliberately refused to tour Poland in case he merely

fanned the flames." He speaks of a secret "roundtable" agreement whereby Walesa let the communist nomenclatura retain property and economic power in return for political authority. He accuses Walesa of deliberately slowing down the changes and of treating the "roundtable" talks not as pure tactics, as they should have been treated, but as a Finlandization of Poland. "The Belvedere's policies do not serve to strengthen Poland," Kaczynski says.

Jan Parys, defense minister in the Olszewski Government, says in *June Frauds* that Lech Walesa wanted to purchase nuclear weapons from Ukraine. On 8 January, Parys said at the headquarters of the Labor Party that Rear Admiral Czeslaw Wawrzyniak, chief of the Military Information Service, once paid him a visit with a message from the president ordering the purchase of nuclear weapons. Wawrzyniak asked for \$100 million for this purpose, because that was the price demanded by "dealers," adding that "we will not pay in any case, because our commandos will jump out of the bushes and chase the dealers away, and we will grab the warheads."

Parys said he was revealing this information only because of the adoption of the small constitution which has considerably increased the powers of the president. Otherwise he would have kept quiet.

Asked whether it is true that Minister Wachowski is a Security Service agent, Presidential Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski said that "the latest sensations have one thing in common—they are not backed up by any documentary evidence."

"The frustration and imagination of has-been politicians is spreading at the same speed as society's disapproval of their activities," said Drzycimski. "The seeking of petty sensations is placing them in the same category as the authors of cheap science fiction. The sad thing is that those who had their chance to do something good for Poland are now trying to attract attention by claiming to possess sensational material."

Asked whether Minister Wachowski or President Walesa intend to bring charges of libel, Drzycimski replied: "Does a pedestrian take any notice of the insects crawling in the cracks in the pavement?"

## **YUGOSLAVIA**

### **Serbian Leader on Availability of Nuclear Weapons**

LD0701142693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service  
in Serbo-Croatian 1318 GMT 7 Jan 93

[Text] Zagreb, 7 Jan (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs, said in an interview with the Zagreb weekly GLOBUS that he agrees that the war should end by political means, even by a compromise and at the price of losing something. "We do not agree to give up the right to self-defense, however," Karadzic stressed.

Asked by GLOBUS whether Bosnian Serbs have nuclear weapons, Karadzic said Serbs will defend themselves with all available means. "It is not difficult to procure nuclear weapons on the open market, even if we do not have them," Karadzic said.

Asked about the proposed map of Bosnia, Karadzic said it "is just a starting point" acceptable for further work.

"We are not giving up what Mate Boban, the leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, said: that there are three nations, three sovereign nations whose sovereignty is manifested in consensus rule and in territorial division," Karadzic said.

He warned that the war will continue if someone wants to reintegrate Bosnia again, because, according to Karadzic, Bosnia "is naturally divided into three entities" and can exist only as a confederation.

#### **Serb Commander Says Use of N-Arms 'Not Ruled Out'**

*PM1101152993 Milan PANORAMA in Italian  
10 Jan 93 p 117*

[Interview with Momir Talic, commander of the First Serb Army Corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina by PANORAMA correspondent, in Banja Luka; date not given]

[Text] Banja Luka—General Momir Talic commands the First Serb Army Corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. PANORAMA met with him in Banja Luka.

[PANORAMA] Are Serb commanders afraid of Western military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Talic] Absolutely not. To date the Serb army has only used 10 to 15 percent of its firepower. In case of aggression by the Americans and their allies, we will unleash total war. We will die, but we will take thousands of your soldiers with us. I do not rule out the use of a nuclear weapon as well.

[PANORAMA] In what way?

[Talic] Some bombs could end up on the Krsko atomic power station [bureau records show Krsko as being in Slovenia]. Can you imagine where the fallout would fall?

[PANORAMA] Has the international community isolated you politically?

[Talic] We still have many good friends who help us and support us.

[PANORAMA] You claim that 15,000 foreign Muslims are fighting in Bosnia. So how come there are no mujahidin among the over 100,000 civilians and military that you have captured?

[Talic] It is simple: They do not allow themselves to be taken alive.

[PANORAMA] The West is preparing to hit your airplanes: Are you not afraid of ending up like Saddam Husayn's Iraq?

[Talic] No. This will be a totally different conflict. Aggression against the Serbs would cause the Balkans to explode and would carry the war into the heart of Europe. We are ready. And you?

## ARGENTINA

### **Condor-2 To Be Shipped to Spain for Dismantling** *PM0801131693 Madrid ABC in Spanish 7 Jan 93 p 24*

[Report by J. Olmo y Losada: "Argentine 'Condor-2' Missile To Be Destroyed in Spain"]

[Text] Buenos Aires—The famous Argentine "Condor-2" missile, suitably dismembered, is about to be transported to Spain amid great security measures. It is not known with absolute certainty whether the "Condor-2" is a highly sophisticated secret weapon or a scientific vehicle designed for the peaceful use of launching satellites. People have gone so far as to claim, possibly exaggerating, that with this missile the Malvinas [Falklands] archipelago would have been utterly at the Argentine military's mercy.

For some days 14 engines and 30 fuselages of the Argentine "Condor-2" missile have been stored at the Puerto Belgrano naval base at Bahia Blanca, an important fishing and petrochemical center at the Pampa's southern end; they are going to be shipped to our country tomorrow by sea, by the Navy's Bahia San Blas transport ship, to a port whose name has not been revealed, but which could very well be the Rota air and naval base in Cadiz province.

The missile, or missiles (it is unclear whether there is one or two), were transported from the Argentine city of Cordoba at a very slow speed, in a secret operation under the command of Brigadier Genero Sciola. All precautions were taken to prevent the missile's various parts from receiving violent shocks or frictional movement

liable to cause overheating in the engines' sealant [argamasas], which could give rise to an element of danger.

What is the Condor-2? It is a missile developed by the Argentine Air Force and in which certain partisans of impossible adventures placed all their hopes, especially in relation to the impossible dream of recovering the Malvinas by use of force. It has been said, and written, of this missile that it was capable of being launched against a target located 1,200 km away, with a 3,000 meter margin of error, and bearing whatever warhead could be found at the last minute. Apparently the United States, via Terence Todman, its ambassador in Buenos Aires, has tried to obtain assurances from the Argentine Government that the missile in question would be dismantled and, especially, that it would not fall into the hands of unscrupulous individuals and irresponsible governments.

The final meetings to reach agreement on the shipment of the "Condor-2's" components to Spain were held in Buenos Aires toward the middle of last month. That country's foreign and defense ministers and the Spanish and U.S. ambassadors met in the Argentine Foreign Ministry. During the meeting, the North American representative showed excessive mistrust of Spain, and the Argentine foreign minister found himself having to defend our country's political and democratic probity, making it clear that no suspicions should be harbored against the Spanish.

The cost of the operation of shipping the "Condor-2" to Spain is being borne entirely by the Argentine Republic. The agreement between the two countries stipulates that the missile's recyclable parts will be used for peaceful purposes, in practice for projects in cooperation with Spain's Institute for Aerospace Technology for launching satellites into orbit.



## EGYPT

**Study Explains Arab Position on CWs Treaty**

NC1201085993

[Editorial Report] Government-owned Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic on 8 January publishes on page 7 an approximately 3,000-word report entitled "The Arabs and the Upcoming Chemical Weapons Treaty" prepared by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam from the paper's Political and Strategic Studies Center.

The writer begins by stating that the mid-January 1993 signing of the treaty banning chemical weapons "takes on particular importance for the Arab countries." He says that in the past few months, some have expected a clash between certain influential world countries and a number of Arab states over the Arabs' lack of enthusiasm for the treaty. He adds: "But the potential for this clash largely has diminished for various reasons, including the Arab states' approach to the treaty and the fact that the treaty itself, in its final wording, will go through various stages which may not make it necessary for the states to adopt decisive and immediate positions on it."

The writer notes that the potential for "provocation" still exists, however, and this may continue to be the case unless some agreement is reached during the meetings of the Working Group on Armament and Security emanating from the multilateral Mideast peace talks.

Noting that the chemical weapons convention—which has not yet become a treaty—raised much debate during its formulation, the writer says Egypt and other countries called for protecting the rights of developing countries against the possibility of depriving them from the chemicals necessary for their development plans. He says Egypt, fearing that the inspection rights may be abused, also demanded that states be protected against any attempts to pressure them politically.

Discussing the Arab position on the treaty, the writer says: "The Arab countries support the ban on the development, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, encourage their removal from the region, and thoroughly understand the principles on which the treaty was based. They are not opposed to the treaty in principle, although they have reservations about some of its clauses. Indeed, the Arab countries, or some of them, may sign the treaty, but they are not likely to ratify it—that is, they will not fully join the treaty in a way that makes them completely committed to it before a balanced understanding on all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is reached."

The writer explains that the Arabs believe that nuclear weapons, not chemical weapons, pose the greatest threat to regional security. "If the removal of chemical weapons is critical for the regional stability, then a concurrent removal of nuclear weapons is even more important," the writer says. To substantiate this argument, the writer refers to the fact that "only one state in the region

possesses nuclear weapons." He says that for one thing, the absence of a counter nuclear deterrent to prevent this state from using its nuclear weapons keeps the situation in the region unstable. For another, it forces the other states in the region to continue attempts to gain nuclear weapons. The writer further maintains that "the Arab countries' possession of chemical capabilities would serve as a deterrent—though minimal—against nuclear weapons, creating a stable situation and relative strategic balance in the region."

The writer then notes some Arab statements linking the Arabs' signing of the chemical weapons treaty to Israel's joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He maintains that this will not solve the problem because the latter treaty, unlike the former, prohibits the development and production of nuclear weapons without addressing the nuclear stock that already exists. "While the Arabs will be asked to remove the chemical capabilities they already possess, Israel will retain its nuclear stock untouched."

At the end of his article, the writer discusses the consequences of "signing but not ratifying" the treaty, contending that the Arabs will not be in trouble if they do so. He says the penalties which the influential countries are talking about are linked to the actual use of chemical weapons. "The sanctions," he explains, "are not directly linked to the treaty; they will be imposed—through the Security Council—on any country that uses chemical weapons, even if not member to the treaty." The writer further explains that the sanctions restrict dealing in commercial chemicals and equipment that can be used for chemical weapons production. But he adds that "many of these materials and equipment already are banned." Moreover, he says, the Arabs will have two years before any serious talk about penalties begins, as the procedure for joining the treaty may take at least two years. The writer, continuing to explain why the Arabs should not worry turning their backs on the chemical weapons treaty, finally notes that many large countries, such as China, Pakistan, India, Brazil, and Argentina, do have reservations about the treaty, and some of them may not sign it, which may open the way for new discussions.

**Egypt, Syria Reiterate Rejection**NC1301160993 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1550 GMT  
13 Jan 93

[Text] Damascus, 13 Jan (MENA)—Egypt and Syria have reiterated that they will not sign the agreement on chemical weapons until Middle East arms control becomes balanced without exception, particularly in view of Israel's nuclear armament. Information Minister Safwat al-Sharif made this statement and added that the joint Egyptian-Syrian meeting held in Damascus today dealt with the question of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

## INDIA

### Export of Dual-Use Chemicals Regulated

BK3012162892 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 1530 GMT 30 Dec 92

[Text] The center has regulated the export of dual purpose [use] chemicals which can be used both for civilian purposes and for making chemical weapons. This has been done to fulfill the commitment of India to eliminate chemical weapons. According to a press release, a prior license is now required to export these chemicals listed in the para 159 of the exim policy [sentence as heard]. The exporter has to provide additional information while applying for a license and it will be scrutinized by a high powered committee. With this step, the exim policy covers all the chemicals included in the UN Chemical Weapons Convention.

## IRAQ

### Seven Atomic Scientists Said Executed in Baghdad

NC0901155493 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Islamic  
Revolution in Arabic 1440 GMT 9 Jan 93

[Text] Well-informed sources inside Iraq have reported that seven senior Iraqi atomic scientists were executed by the authorities of dictator Saddam Husayn in a secret prison in Baghdad a few days ago. The same sources added that the ostensible reason for the execution of the seven scientists was their protest at the assassination of atomic scientist Mu'ayyad al-Janabi by the regime's intelligence elements in Jordan. Reliable sources have said that the real reason for the execution was the regime's fear that the scientists would escape abroad and expose the regime's secret armament program and the international firms that have contributed to it.

The regime has tightened its security measures around scientists, interfered in their private affairs, and detained their family members with a view to preventing them from leaking information abroad on the weapons of mass destruction.

## ISRAEL

### Charges of Technology Transfer to PRC 'Baseless'

TA0601093593 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Jan 93  
p 2

[Report from Washington by Drora Perl]

[Text] In a meeting with THE WASHINGTON TIMES editorial staff two days ago, CIA head Robert Gates said that China has acquired the Patriot antimissile missile technology and that there is disagreement within the Bush administration on whether it was Israel that provided it to the PRC.

This was the first time the U.S. Administration publicly confirmed that the Chinese have the advanced technology of the Patriot missiles. Gates, who is due to end his term with the coming change of administrations next month, refused to elaborate or say who the CIA believes provided the Chinese with the technology.

Gates said there are "disagreements on the question" of whether last April's State Department report, which cleared Israel of the charge of transferring the technology to China, underestimated contradictory intelligence information.

When asked about this yesterday, Israel's Ambassador Zalman Shoval unequivocally said that innuendoes and allegations following the publication of the report by a committee that visited Israel are baseless.

## PAKISTAN

### Finance Minister Says Japan To Link Aid, Nuclear Issue

OW2112134192 Tokyo KYODO in English 1323 GMT  
21 Dec 92

[Text] Islamabad, Dec. 21 KYODO—Pakistani Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz said Monday [21 December] future Japanese aid to Pakistan would be linked to Pakistan's nuclear program. But he said an estimated 40-50 billion yen package prepared for signing during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's December 16-19 visit to Japan has been exempted from this principle.

He told a press briefing the Japanese Government has offered to help promote a resolution of the nuclear issue between Pakistan and India, and in this context high-level Indo-Japanese talks are scheduled in New Delhi for February next year. A Japanese team is also expected to visit Pakistan to discuss the nuclear issue after the talks in India, Aziz said.

About a week before Sharif's Japan visit, Japanese Ambassador Kunio Muraoka told the Pakistani Government it would not be possible to sign the package because of the screening of an NBC report on Pakistan's nuclear program on Japanese TV, informed sources said. Most of the 90-minute meeting between Sharif and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa was taken up by the nuclear issue, Aziz said.

Although Sharif stated that Pakistan's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, Miyazawa pointed out that the weapons-oriented nature of Pakistan's nuclear program has been confirmed by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto "and this caused some embarrassment," Aziz said. But he was confident that Sharif's visit to Japan has cleared "some of the mist" from Pakistan's nuclear program and it would be possible to sign the yen package in the next four to six weeks.

**Nuclear Installation Lists Exchanged With India**

*BK0401153993 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network  
in Urdu 1500 GMT 4 Jan 93*

[Text] Pakistan and India have exchanged lists of their nuclear installations and facilities for the second consecutive year. A Foreign Office statement in Islamabad today said that the exchange of lists was carried out simultaneously in Islamabad and New Delhi as stipulated in the Pakistan-India agreement on nonaggression on each other's nuclear installations.

**Excavation for Chinese Nuclear Power Plant Noted**

*BK2612145492 Islamabad PTV Television Network  
in English 1400 GMT 26 Dec 92*

[Text] Excavation for civil work of the 300 megawatt nuclear power plant began at Chashma in District Mianwali this afternoon. Chinese and Pakistani personnel associated with the project were present on the occasion. The Chashma Nuclear Power Plant has been supplied by China under a contract signed in Beijing in December last year. Basic design work of the project has already been completed.



## COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

### Gen Ivashov on Control of Strategic N-Arms

LD0601152393 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service  
in English 1910 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] The Unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States are still in the making a year after being formed. General Leonid Ivashov of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council dwells upon the composition and the future of the forces:

[Begin recording] [Ivashov in Russian fading to English translation] The unified forces are made up of nuclear weapons, collective peacekeeping forces, and a newly emerging contingent for the prevention of conflicts at CIS external borders.

[Unidentified correspondent] What is the numerical strength of the CIS Forces?

[Ivashov] Troop numbers are yet to be defined, given that CIS member states, particularly Ukraine, are largely at odds even on the strength of the strategic forces.

[Correspondent] Are there any differences on who is to be in charge of the strategic nuclear weapons, Ukraine or Kazakhstan in particular?

[Ivashov] Differences do exist following a unilateral decision by Ukraine on administrative control of nuclear arms deployed on its territory. The question of the future and control of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal will go on the agenda of the next CIS summit in the light of uncertainties about the future of such destructive weapons as ICBMs.

[Correspondent] Are nuclear weapons under safe control?

[Ivashov] The existing automated systems and organizational structures are capable of blocking any unauthorized use of the strategic weapons.

[Correspondent] In which way are the nuclear weapons split between the Unified CIS forces and signatory states?

[Ivashov] Russia has its own nuclear stockpile including long range missiles, but the interests of the three other nuclear states—that is, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—are represented by the chief command of the CIS forces, which insists it must be solely in charge of the CIS nuclear forces and represent the interests of those three republics under coordinated CIS nuclear policy.

[Correspondent] How soon is the CIS force likely to play a peacekeeping role in CIS member countries, similar to that of the UN peace contingent?

[Ivashov] The chief command of the CIS forces will be in charge of the organization's peacekeeping contingent

which is yet to be established. Although differences do exist, I am sure that such a force will eventually be set up. [end recording]

### Kozyrev on Ukraine, Kazakhstan Nuclear Problems

LD0301223593 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 2000 GMT 3 Jan 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Part of the nuclear potential of the former USSR is concentrated in three other republics. This was recalled today by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. Today he reported on plans for Russian experts who have been working on the START II treaty to visit the three independent states. Ukraine has already agreed to this. Kozyrev considers that there is a tendency in Ukraine to use for political ends the fact that there are Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of the republic. The situation is made worse by the fact that there are two different political forces operating in Ukraine.

The minister noted that a similar situation is also developing in Kazakhstan, from where, he said, mixed signals are emanating regarding Alma-Ata's approach to issues of nuclear disarmament. Andrey Kozyrev still hopes that a correct point of view will prevail, however.

## RUSSIA

### Reaction to Signing of Start II Treaty With U.S.

#### Armed Forces Chief of Staff Comments

LD0601143993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1406 GMT 6 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The drastic cuts in strategic offensive weapons envisaged by the START-2 Treaty signed in Moscow by the Russian and U.S. Presidents early in January will not affect the Russian security as the remaining number of warheads is enough for an efficient deterrence force, according to chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces Mikhail Kolesnikov.

The nuclear potential of both sides will decrease by three times, according to preliminary estimates, and the cuts will be accompanied by structural changes in the strategic forces of the United States and Russia, he told reporters on Wednesday.

By eliminating MIRV ICBM's the parties to the treaty get rid of the dangerous temptation of the first preventive strike. Besides, the Russian MIRV ICBM's are to be decommissioned in 10-15 years and they had to be anyway eliminated, he added.

Russia retains the basis of its nuclear might which is comprised by ground-based nuclear missiles. Heavy missiles with 10 warheads will be replaced by missiles with one warhead which both sides view as a stabilisation factor, the chief of staff said.

The armaments of the SS-19 missiles will also be reduced to one warhead which will allow to keep 105 missiles of the type in the Russian strategic force, he added.

Although Americans first insisted on complete elimination of all silo launchers for heavy ICBM's, Russia succeeded to agree in the treaty on a possibility of using 90 silos for new single-warhead missiles after the silos are reequipped in such a way so that former heavy missiles cannot be deployed in them. This would save Russia some 2 billion roubles (in 1992 prices), Kolesnikov said.

The basis of the U.S. nuclears might—the strategic bombers—will also undergo considerable changes. The United States agreed to really, and not conditionally as envisaged by START-1, to count all nuclear charges deployed on heavy bombers. This eliminates all ways of bypassing the provisions of the new treaty, he added.

The START-1 envisaged that U.S. heavy bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles have 10 charges while the planes can carry 25 missiles. This allowed the United States to exceed the 6-thousand limit of nuclear charges by 2-2.5 thousand pieces thanks to their strategic bombers. Now the possibility is excluded, the chief of staff explained.

The START-2 also envisages a major reduction of U.S. sea-based nuclear charges: by three times compared to the existing level and by two times compared to the level allowed by the START-1. In question are the latest "Trident-2" missiles, Kolesnikov said.

The START-2 limits the number of charges on heavy bombers by 850-1250 pieces which would make the United States cut its air-based nuclear weapons, Kolesnikov said.

He said that the two countries which move towards a lower level of nuclear armaments have the right to expect that other nuclear states—Great Britain, France and China—will join nuclear disarmament talks in future.

He also added that Russia, while reducing its strategic forces, takes into account the commitments of both countries under the ABM Treaty which limits the deployment of anti-missile systems aimed at eliminating offensive weapons and thus remains the basis of strategic stability.

The cuts envisaged by the START-2 will cost Russia considerably less than the maintenance of the nuclear systems until they are to be decommissioned. Besides, the elimination expenses will be considerably reduced thanks to cooperation with the United States in designing corresponding technologies. The United States

pledged to render financial help to Russia for the elimination of strategic offensive weapons, the chief of staff said.

Russian nuclear forces will not be a "mirror reflection" of the U.S. ones under the START-2, Kolesnikov said, adding, however, that certain moves in this direction will take place. Thus, Russia will, most evidently, increase the sea-based component of its strategic force. This concerns, first and foremost, submarine-based ballistic missiles, he disclosed.

While signing the START-2, both sides realised that it may come into force after Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan ratify the START-1 and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-free states. A draft agreement on the status of strategic forces deployed in Ukraine was forwarded to the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, Kolesnikov said, adding that the draft says that nuclear weapons should have a definite state-owner.

Ukraine cannot provide for reliable maintenance of nuclear charges and "we do not need that our neighbour, the fraternal people has a chance of a new Chernobyl", he added.

#### People's Deputy Astafyev Speaks

LD0601174793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1302 GMT 6 Jan 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Aleksey Tabachnikov]

[Excerpts] Moscow January 6 TASS—A press conference, held at the parliamentary centre here on Wednesday by the Rossiyskoye Edinstvo (Russian Unity) opposition bloc, dealt with the results of Tuesday's session of the Coordinating Council of the Russian All-People's Union (RAPU). The press conference was attended by People's Deputies Sergey Baburin and Mikhail Astafyev. [passage omitted]

Astafyev devoted the bulk of his remarks at the press conference to the START-2 Treaty signed on January 3, this year, and stated that the need to reduce nuclear arms does not arouse protest among the parliamentary opposition.

Having pointed out that he is not prepared so far to give a detailed analysis of the treaty, Astafyev criticised "the very pace of the conclusion" of the document and "persons involved in elaborating it", the Russian minister of foreign affairs, in particular.

Speaking about prospects for a ratification of the treaty, Astafyev said the question should not be even raised now. At first, in the opinion of the people's deputy, it is essential "to inquire into the fact of an unlawful appointment of Andrey Kozyrev to the ministerial post".

Another hindrance is posed by the unclear stand of Ukraine as regards the START-1 and START-2 Treaties.

Baburin also declared in favour of not being in a hurry to ratify the treaty signed several days ago.

"Agreements on any cuts in the Armed Forces and armaments may be ratified by the Russian parliament only after a concept of foreign policy and a defence doctrine of Russia are endorsed", he said.

#### **Deputy Defense Minister on Ramifications**

OW0601203493 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1902 GMT 6 Jan 93

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Andrey Kokoshin in an interview with INTERFAX on Wednesday [6 January] said the Start-II treaty did not contravene the optimal structure of the country's nuclear deterrence.

He said that while forming its position at the Start-II negotiations, the Defence Ministry had tried to visualise the composition of Russia's nuclear forces in the years 2005-2010. The projected make up of the forces, he said, is optimal and falls largely within the framework of the Start-II agreement signed in Moscow on January 3.

Under the treaty, Russia forfeits its powerful SS-18 long range missiles but rids itself of the dangerous magnet inviting a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Kokoshin says that two enemy warheads would have been sufficient to destroy a silo hiding a 10-warhead SS-18 missile in the event of a first strike, which is quite a good bargain. But with single warhead missiles on both sides, any pre-emptive strike is meaningless, he said.

The Defence Ministry believes that the main rub is the process of destroying nuclear weapons. It cannot be said with a fair amount of certainty, Kokoshin went on to say, that fairly effective technologies are available to do so, and it is a matter of money and time before these are developed.

On strategic bombers, Kokoshin said this component of the strategic forces was worse-hit. He said it was most unlikely that Russia would be able to raise money to meet ceilings set under the Start-II treaty, since the manufacturing cost of a strategic bomber had become very high. Although the Americans have a lot of bombers, Kokoshin said, they have also had to curtail the production of bomber aircraft in recent times.

The minister expressed satisfaction that long-range submarine-launched missiles were now available.

Kokoshin does not expect any substantial cost-saving from the destruction of nuclear weapons, saying the cost would be rather high in the first years of disarmament but would fall later since less spending would be needed for a smaller nuclear force. The savings will be used for research and updating purposes, however.

#### **Grachev Voices Support**

LD0901145693 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service  
in English 1210 GMT 9 Jan 93

[Text] The Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START II, signed in Moscow in the first days of the new year, is considered by Russia and the Russian military, as was the rare case earlier [as heard], as an unprecedented and successful compromise. At our microphone is the Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev.

[Begin Grachev recording in Russian with superimposed translation into English] The treaty is aimed at strengthening strategic stability, and ensuring the security of Russia and the United States through a dramatic reduction of their nuclear arsenals. By January in the year 2003, the number of warheads in Russia and the United States will be reduced three to four times, and will be three to three and a half thousand each. The United States will slash nuclear systems that arouse most alarm in Russia. Among them will be high precision warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine ballistic missiles including the Trident-2 system, as well as long range cruise missiles, short-range control missiles, and nuclear bombs for heavy bombers. Russia pledges to eliminate heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles which are of most concern for the United States. The decision was conditioned by political, military-strategic, and economic considerations.

Having agreed to eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles, Russia actually gave up plans of their further modernization and production. The service limit of these missiles expires and more cannot be produced. They were earlier manufactured in Ukraine. Their production in Russia would require enormous financial and other expenditures. The reduction limits set by START II do not deprive Russia of its nuclear potential. Its strategic forces, formed in compliance with the treaty, will have such combat capabilities that will curb attacks by any potential aggressor, said the general. [end recording]

Asked about the attitude by other Commonwealth countries, which still have nuclear weapons, to the Russian-American treaty, General Grachev said the following:

[Begin Grachev recording in Russian with superimposed translation into English] They think it's a positive step. The treaty would not have been signed if the leaders of the Commonwealth states bearing strategic nuclear weapons had doubted its expediency. I mean Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, concluded Russia's Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev. [end recording]

#### **Kozyrev Cited on Chemical Weapons Convention**

PM1301163593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
14 Jan 93 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Yuriy Kovalenko: "A Chemical Weapons Convention Is Easier To Sign Than To Implement. Some



### Experts Doubt Whether the Document Will Completely Eliminate the Danger of a Gas Attack"]

[Excerpt] Paris—On Wednesday, at 1600 hours, in the Paris headquarters of UNESCO, French President Francois Mitterrand opened the ceremony to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Storage, and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction.

As we reported before, this document, which was elaborated under UN auspices and which envisages for the first time ever the total elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, will be signed by around 115 states in the space of three days.

"We have been working toward this convention for a long time," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said, answering your correspondent's question on his arrival at Orly Airport, "and, if you recall, the last five years or so used to begin with words to the effect that this year would be the year when the convention will be signed. The fact that it is finally being signed is, in particular, the result of the bold stance we adopted on biological weapons and our honest steps on chemical weapons."

The signing of the convention is closely associated with the START treaty, A. Kozyrev went on to say. Crucial advances have now been made on two major problems. Whereas it is unrealistic to expect complete disarmament in the foreseeable future, the START II Treaty does significantly mitigate the problem of the nuclear threat, as it has existed for the past 30 years. The chemical threat is virtually removed.

But a whole series of new problems arises, the Russian minister said, which demand just as much commitment on our part and the same kind of international cooperation as when the convention was being prepared. First, there is its implementation—that is, the destruction of chemical weapons. Second, the universalization of the convention—all states putting their name to it. What comes to the forefront, really, is the issue of nonproliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons.

The chemical weapons are becoming obsolete and they are becoming dangerous, Andrey Kozyrev pointed out. Either we disarm unilaterally, by eliminating them and spending money on that, or we do it in conjunction with the United States and other powers. So we now have the best-case scenario—we will engage in disarmament, but together with the others. [passage omitted]

### Reports Continue on Exporting Dual-Use Materials

#### Yeltsin Signs Directive

OW3012171292 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1642 GMT 30 Dec 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The presidential press service reported Tuesday that President Boris Yeltsin has signed a directive

introducing control over export from Russia of dual purpose materials and equipment, as well as the know-how used for nuclear purposes. Their export will be strictly regulated by special licenses.

The list of licensed for export dual purpose equipment, materials and know-how authorized by the president includes eight major sections.

Listed under the industrial equipment, in particular, are computerized N/C machine tools; special software to them; dimensions control systems and devices; high-precision linear and angular measuring devices; vacuum and electric arc melting and foundry furnaces; high power presses; robots and tools for operation in explosion-hazardous environment; radiation-resistant devices with relevant software.

The list of dual purpose materials includes heavy-duty aluminum, beryllium, super-pure bismuth, calcium and boron alloys and compounds; crucibles containing or plated with tungsten, titanium, yttrium, zirconium and niobium alloys and compounds; carbon fibre materials; enriched lithium; super-pure magnesium; several grades of hafnium alloys; radium-226, except for that contained in medical devices; other titanium alloys.

The uranium isotopes fission equipment and components section lists frequency inverters and converters; laser devices; laser amplifiers and generators; mass spectrometers; vacuum pumps; high-voltage DC sources; electromagnetic isotope generators.

The list of heavy water production facilities specifies specialized equipment designed to separate heavy water from ordinary water; hydrogen cryogenic distillery plants; ammonium synthesizing converters and their elements.

Listed under the equipment for detonating systems liable to licensing are pulse X-ray generators and electronic accelerators; high-velocity systems capable of imparting to projectiles the velocity of 2 kps [expansion not given] and more; electronic frame-type and tracking chambers; special devices for hydrodynamic experiments.

The list of explosives and associated equipment includes, in particular, detonators and multi-point initiating systems; electronic components for launching (ignition) systems; powerful explosive materials and composites.

The list of nuclear test equipment and components includes oscillographs and digital registering devices; photo-multiplying pipes; super-high velocity pulse generators.

The section "other equipment" is listing neutron generator systems; the equipment pertaining to nuclear reactors and nuclear materials; tritium and its compounds; plants and equipment for production, restoration,

extraction and concentration of tritium; waterproof platinum catalyzers for boosting hydrogen isotopes and water exchange; any helium isotopes; alpha-radiating nuclides.

The Russian President has instructed the government to adopt the directive in regards to control over export from Russia of the above dual purpose materials, equipment and know-how.

#### Customs Orders Chemical Controls

934P0028A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian  
No 40, 2-8 Nov 92 p 17

[Russian Federation State Customs Committee Order No 465 of 15 October 1992, under rubric "Documents: Chemicals Export Control"]

[Excerpts]

#### Russian Federation State Customs Committee Order No 465

15 October 1992, Moscow

#### On Imposing Control Over the Export of Chemicals and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose But Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons

The State Customs Committee order which arrived at customs houses last week limits the export of a number of chemicals and the technologies for producing them. The order is being published in abbreviated form and the list of chemicals and technologies is being published fully.

...The statute provides a set of measures for export control of chemicals and technologies which have a peaceful purpose but can be used in creating chemical weapons (hereafter "dual-use chemicals and technologies"). The procedure for control of exports of dual-use chemicals and technologies from the Russian Federation provides for preparing and issuing an opinion on the

possibility of exporting dual-use chemicals and technologies enumerated in the List, and licensing and declaring dual-use chemicals and technologies.

The statute also provides for the following:

1. In concluding contracts (agreements) for export of dual-use chemicals and technologies included in the List, subjects of economic activity on territory of the Russian Federation or in places (points) under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Federation regardless of forms of ownership point out on a mandatory basis the requirement that the importer will not use these chemicals and technologies to produce chemical weapons, will not reexport them or transfer them to anyone whomsoever without permission for this in writing from the exporter, coordinated on a mandatory basis with the Russian Federation Government Export Control Commission.

2. Dual-use chemicals and technologies included in the List cannot be exported from the Russian Federation or be reexported to a state which violates the ban on use of chemical weapons...[passage omitted]

4. Dual-use chemicals and technologies included in the List are exported only under one-time licenses issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

5. The basis for issuing licenses is an opinion of the Russian Federation Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation Government on the possibility of exporting dual-use chemicals and technologies.

To obtain an opinion, an application for issue of a license, made out in accordance with requirements established by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, is sent to the Russian Federation Ministry of Economy Export Control Department (103009, Moscow, Okhotnyy ryad, 1), which is a working body of the Russian Federation Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation Government. Copies of the contract and document providing the importer's guarantees of nonuse of the object of export in producing chemical weapons are appended to the application...

Annex to Russian State Customs Committee Order No 465 of 15 October 1992

#### List of Chemicals and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose But Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons, and Which are Exported Under License

##### Section I. Chemicals\*

Position No.	Chemicals	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Nomenclature Code
1.1.	Compounds having one P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond	293100100, 293100200, 293100300, 293100900
1.2.	N, N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride	292119900
1.3.	N, N-diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol	293090800
1.4.	N, N-diisopropylaminoethane-2-ol	292219000
1.5.	Diethyl-N, N-dimethylamidophosphates	292119900
1.6.	Pinacolyl alcohol	290519900
1.7.	3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine	293339900
1.8.	Quinuclidine-3-ol	293339900

**List of Chemicals and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose But Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons, and Which are Exported Under License (Continued)**

**Section 1. Chemicals\***

Position No.	Chemicals	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Nomenclature Code
1.9.	Thiodiglycol	293090800
1.10.	Arsenic trichloride	281210900
1.11.	Cyanogen chloride	285100900
1.12.	Carbonic acid dichloranhydride	281210900
1.13.	Hydrogen cyanide	281119000
1.14.	Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)	290490900
1.15.	Dimethylphosphite	292090200
1.16.	Trimethylphosphite	292090300
1.17.	Diethylphosphite	292090800
1.18.	Triethylphosphite	292090800
1.19.	Dimethylamine hydrochloride	292111900
1.20.	Phosphorus trichloride	281210150
1.21.	Phosphorus pentachloride	281210190
1.22.	Phosphorus oxychloride	281210110
1.23.	Hydrogen fluoride and its salts	281111000,282611000,282619000
1.24.	Benzilic acid	291819900
1.25.	3-Quinuclidone	293339900
1.26.	Dimethylamine	292111110-292111190
1.27.	Thionylchloride	281210900
1.28.	Methylbenzylate	291819900
1.29.	Chloroethanol	290550100
1.30.	Pinacolin	291419000
1.31.	Potassium cyanide	283719000
1.32.	Sulphur monochloride	281210900
1.33.	Sulphur dichloride	281210900
1.34.	Dimethylaminhydrochloride	292111900
1.35.	Sodium cyanide	283711000
1.36.	Triethanolamine	292213000
1.37.	Phosphorus pentasulfide	281390100
1.38.	Diisopropylamine	292119900
1.39.	Diethylaminoethanol	292219000
1.40.	Sodium sulphide	283010000

\*For purposes of fulfilling Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 508-rp of 16 September 1992 and Russian Federation Government Decree No 734 of 18 September 1992, commodities subject to licensing in accordance with this list are specified both by the code TN VED as well as by a textual description of the commodities.

In declaring commodities classified in commodity items of this list, it is necessary to indicate the technical characteristics specified by this list in column 31 of the GTD (not further expanded; possibly state customs document).

**Section 2. Technologies**

2.1.	Technology of producing compounds containing a P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond.
2.1.1.	dimethylmethylphosphonate
2.1.2.	methylphosphonyldifluoride

**Section 2. Technologies (Continued)**

2.1.3.	methylphosphonyldichloride
2.1.4.	diethylethylphosphonate
2.1.5.	ethylphosphonyldichloride
2.1.6.	ethylphosphinyldichloride

**Section 2. Technologies (Continued)**

- 2.1.7. ethylphosphonyldifluoride
- 2.1.8. methylphosphinyldichloride
- 2.1.9. O-ethyl-2-diisopropylaminoethylmethylphosphone
- 2.1.10. diethylmethylphosphonite
- 2.1.11. dimethylethylphosphonate
- 2.1.12. ethylphosphinyldifluoride
- 2.1.13. methylphosphinyldifluoride
- 2.1.14. phosphacrylate
- 2.1.15. phosdiol-A
- 2.1.16. estephane-383
- 2.1.17. hexarane
- 2.1.18. phospoliol 2
- 2.1.19. phostetrol 1
- 2.2. Technology of producing N, N-diisopropylaminethyl-2-chloride
- 2.3. Technology of producing N, N-diisopropylaminoethane-2-ol
- 2.4. Technology of producing N, N-diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol
- 2.5. Technology of producing diethyl-N, N-dimethylamidophosphates
- 2.6. Technology of producing pinacolyl alcohol
- 2.7. Technology of producing thiodiglycol
- 2.8. Technology of producing cyanogen chloride
- 2.9. Technology of producing dimethylphosphite
- 2.10. Technology of producing phosphorus trichloride
- 2.11. Technology of producing phosphorus pentachloride
- 2.12. Technology of producing phosphorus oxychloride

**Academy of Sciences Denies 'Brain Drain' to PRC**  
LD3012153692 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1330 GMT 30 Dec 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—The Russian Academy of Sciences has no information on the "brain drain" of Russian nuclear scientists to China, according to Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice-president of the academy and director of the Kurchatov Nuclear Research Institute.

None of the experts of the major institute which is the leading Russian nuclear centre has left for China, he told TASS on Wednesday, commenting on a report of the Japanese "YOMIURI" newspaper which claimed that "several hundreds of former Soviet specialists are working at Chinese military plants".

Velikhov stressed that the Russian Academy of Sciences has been actively cooperating with China of late, however. A number of agreements on relations in the field of education, natural and public sciences has been recently signed, he added.

**Stolen Uranium Seized From Arzamas-16 Inhabitants**

MK3012145192 Moscow *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian* No. 1, 3 Jan 93 (Signed to Press 29 Dec 92)  
p 5

[Unattributed report: "Atom"]

[Text] While the world is wrestling with the problem of how to prevent the brain drain from centers where people possess the secrets of manufacturing nuclear weapons, a leak of lethal components has begun in these centers.

The security organs have seized 10 kg of uranium from local inhabitants in the closed city of Arzamas-16. Criminal proceedings have been instituted. In the interests of the investigation the thieves' names and professions are not being revealed. All that is known is that they are staffers at an enterprise producing things very far removed from Christmas crackers. Public opinion is being reassured with the fact that the uranium is not concentrated and is a danger to the health of only the thieves themselves. But a lot of questions arise here, the simplest of which is this: If it is just a case of fooling around, why is there an investigation; and if there is an investigation, why is uranium being left lying around like this at a closed nuclear center?

**Severodvinsk Atomic Shipbuilding Center Set Up**  
MK2612114292 Moscow *MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian* 25 Dec 92 p 1

[Unattributed report under "Atomic Thrust" rubric]

[Text] It has been decided to set up a Russian state atomic shipbuilding center based on enterprises in the city of Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast. Its task is to implement a unified technological policy in the construction of underwater and surface ships carrying nuclear devices.

**ARMENIA**

**Official Denies Radiological Weapon Report**  
93US0269B Moscow *TRUD in Russian* 29 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Gagik Karapetyan: "Not for Revenge, but for Warming Up"]

[Text] Yerevan—"No weapons of mass destruction have been or are being built in Armenia," said Eduard Simonyants, first deputy national security adviser to the Armenian president, to a TRUD correspondent. "The



'canard' that was spread with reference to the use of processed fuel from the Armenian nuclear power station for charging bombs and warheads is totally absurd from the scientific and research points of view and in political respect it is a provocation."

First, it might take a year or more to re-fire the Armenian power station that was stopped after the Spitak earthquake of 1988 (if the local authorities decide to pass this long-awaited decision). Second, as our correspondent learned in the Russian science center, Kurchatovskiy Institute, the old, processed nuclear fuel is not sufficiently radioactive to be used as a radiological weapon.

## BELARUS

### Reaction to Russian-U.S. Start II Treaty Noted

#### Kravchenko Welcomes Signing

LD0601165593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1554 GMT 6 Jan 93

[By BELINFORM correspondent Tatyana Khryapina for TASS]

[Text] Minsk January 6 TASS—Belarus genuinely strives to become a neutral, nuclear-free state and welcomes the Russian-U.S. START-2 Treaty, according to Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko.

All tactical nuclear weapons were transferred to Russia from Belarus last year. It was agreed that strategic nuclear arms will be transferred in the coming seven years, however, Belarus decided to accelerate the operation despite all financial difficulties, he told BELINFORM on Wednesday.

Kravchenko called on all other former Soviet nuclear states to abide by the same principled position. The START-2 should become a multilateral treaty, he added.

"Our ideal is the creation of a nuclear-free belt in Central Europe which would cover the Scandinavian countries in the north, the Baltic states, Ukraine, as well as East and Central European states. The first steps towards the goal have already been made by us", he said.

Among the foreign policy priorities Kravchenko listed the intention of Belarus to refrain from participation in any military-political unions or blocs. "Belarus can become truly neutral only when there are no blocs in a new Europe, when NATO will disappear as the Warsaw Treaty did, when free travel of people, ideas, capital, goods and services will become an everyday reality", however, the minister said.

Another major foreign policy goal is the integration of the republic into the European Community and the strengthening of the Commonwealth as the "only existing form of economic survival", he said.

Belarus is also ready to mount its peace-keeping efforts in the U.N. framework, the minister stressed, recalling that the republic has agreed to hold the CSCE conference on Nagorno-Karabakh.

### Supreme Soviet Chairman Comments

LD0701182293 Minsk Radio Minsk Network  
in Belarusian 1815 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Excerpts] Today, Stanislaw Stanislavavich Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, held a meeting with correspondents of information publications. Mikhail Rutkowski, our parliamentary correspondent, also attended the meeting. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] Stanislaw Stanislavavich, commenting on the 3 January signing of the START-II Treaty by Yeltsin and Bush, many Western politicians voice concern over the fact that Ukraine and Belarus have not joined the START process.

[Shushkevich] Belarus greets all global agreements on the reduction of nuclear armaments, including the treaty of 3 January. Our position remains unchanged. We are going over to a nuclear-free status and neutrality. This has today again been confirmed by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet Presidium, where we discussed that issue within a whole range of aspects, and there is no deviation from this completely distinct political line. Belarus does not seek any profit from the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, and confirms once more that it wants to be rid of its nuclear status. If the treaty which has been concluded helps to accelerate the withdrawal of nuclear strategic weapons from the Republic of Belarus we will greet it even more. We do not have the full text of that treaty, therefore I cannot comment further. [passage omitted]

## UKRAINE

### Reaction to Russian-U.S. Start II, Disarmament

#### Kravchuk Statement

LD0301210093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 3 Jan 93

[Text] Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk has issued a statement in connection with the signing of START II, the Russian-U.S. on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The statement stresses in particular that the signing by Russia and the United States of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons is an important political act which testifies to the consistency of steps on the path of nuclear disarmament.

The statement notes that the Russian-U.S. treaty does not place any obligation on Ukraine and the action does not extend to her territory. Along with this, Ukraine is consistently moving toward the aim, declared by its Supreme Council, of becoming a nuclear-free state in the future. I believe, Leonid Kravchuk stressed, that the



higher legislative body of Ukraine will positively examine the treaty on strategic offensive weapons and the Lisbon protocol, and by the same token Ukraine will be one of the first to undertake the historic step in the direction of freeing the world of nuclear weapons.

We call on all states that possess nuclear weapons, the statement says, to follow this example and to cooperate in the direction of creating an atmosphere of trust and security among peoples. We hope that agreements reached earlier will be realized in the next few days and that inter-state Ukrainian-Russian negotiations will take place on a wide range of technical and financial issues connected with the future implementation of the agreement on strategic offensive weapons and the Lisbon protocol.

We regard with approval the initiative of the government of the Russian Federation, the United States, and France about a moratorium on nuclear testing, and appeal for this moratorium to be transformed into a permanent halt to all types of nuclear explosions by all nuclear powers, the statement by Leonid Kravchuk notes.

#### Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments

OW0501172493 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1708 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev and others from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: "Ukraine Will Explain Its Attitude to Nuclear Disarmament Issues Only After Consultations With Washington"—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine's attitude to the START-2 agreement is "favorable." "However it should not be forgotten that this involves a bilateral agreement signed between Russia and the USA. To link Ukrainian missiles to a treaty Ukraine has not signed is unjustifiable and senseless," the leader of the press service of Ukraine's Foreign Ministry, Yuriy Sergeyev, told DP [Diplomatic Panorama].

According to him, Ukraine will view all nuclear missiles stationed on its territory "exclusively in the context of the START-1 agreement."

In the near future Ukraine's Foreign Ministry might come out with an explanation concerning Kiev's attitude to nuclear disarmament issues, the diplomat said. According to him, it will do so when the Ukrainian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, chairman of the National Committee on Disarmament, returns from the USA.

The delegation includes Ukraine's Deputy Defense Minister, Ivan Bizhan, and the chief of the USA and Canada Department of Ukraine's Foreign Ministry, Yuriy Pogoyevskiy. It will be received by the American

Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney. In addition, delegates from Ukraine will meet with high-ranking State Department officials.

According to Y. Sergeyev, the need to conduct political consultations between Ukraine and the USA, "particularly on the issue of nuclear disarmament," emerged long ago. The diplomat made it clear that in Washington the Ukrainian delegation intends to discuss the possibility of granting guarantees to Ukraine, and reach agreement on setting up a mechanism for bilateral consultations on military problems.

#### Officers Union Opposes Moscow Control

LD0301200693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 3 Jan 93

[Text] The Kiev organization of the Union of Officers of Ukraine has proposed to immediately remove strategic missiles located on the territory of Ukraine from the central management system in Moscow. Members of the officers' association consider that instability in Russia threatens its neighbors with unpleasantness. It is theoretically possible for the Ukraine president to block the missile launch system, but the creation of technical means for this demands much time and many millions in expenditure. In the opinion of the Kiev officers, Ukraine cannot waste time or money on this. They also propose to immediately begin removing missiles produced at Ukraine's plants from the order of battle and preparing them for destruction.

#### Nuclear Disarmament Problems Eyed

AU0401125793 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
22 Dec 92 p 7

[Article by Colonel Valeriy Izmalkov, people's deputy: "A Nuclear Missile Is Not a Stone Axe"]

[Text] I will start with an attempt to determine: Against whom are these weapons to be used? A number of deputies openly point to Ukraine's northern neighbor as an enemy. We know that there are political forces in Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia that have territorial claims on Ukraine (in this respect, the most powerful and the most aggressive forces are in Romania). Will a strategic nuclear missile with a range of over 8,500 kilometers stop the aggressor in any of the aforementioned countries? (The distance from Kiev to the extreme western point of Romania, along a straight line, is just 1,000 kilometers).

On the other hand, let us take the force of the charge. During the existence of the USSR, one of the military academies conducted a mathematical modelling of possible results of launching one SS-24 missile with six warheads with 300 kilotonnes each at Cape Canaveral (in the State of Florida in the United States). In three days, the level of radioactive contamination of the entire territory of the United States and Canada would have exceeded, by a factor of 60 (!), the level of contamination

in the 30-kilometer zone of the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Plant. The only difference is in that the half-life of the radioactive substances in the Chernobyl area allows one to hope that life there will be restored by the middle of the next century, whereas the half-life of the substances that would result from the explosion for military purposes amounts to 34,000 years.

Then, against whom are these weapons to be used? One of the deputies told me directly that he needs these weapons to restore stability in our region by black-mailing the United States.

The Americans are not only people of action, but they also have enough sense of humor. For today's Iraq, they have coined a definition: "a potentially aggressive country." If a corresponding definition is also found for us, then our international isolation will be guaranteed. Deputies M. Porovskyy, S. Khmara, V. Tolubko, and other advocates of maintaining nuclear weapons are saying that the United States and other countries will only sit with us at the negotiating table and discuss credits or technological aid if a hedge of missiles rises behind the Ukrainian president's back.

I want to recall that Ukraine's economic situation does not give us grounds to speak about a possibility to overcome the crisis on our own. Therefore, we cannot do without the help from the West. Kyrgyzstan that never had nuclear weapons was the second [after Russia] country that received the most-favored-nation status in trade with the United States; and the third country was Belarus, which had specified its attitude toward such weapons.

The second problem regarding the nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine is technical. This type of weapon may be divided into two components—the means of delivery and the warhead proper. Things are more or less clear where the means of delivery are concerned: We have strategic bombers, and we have launch vehicles that are manufactured in Ukraine. Just two things must be pointed out here. We do have bombers, but they have nothing to carry: The bombs and cruise missiles of this class were transferred to Russia in May, and our bombers are not equipped to carry strategic missile warheads. There is yet another aspect dealing with missiles: There are 176 launchers on the territory of Ukraine; 130 of them are of old type—with liquid propellant (they were manufactured in Russia); 46 are of new type—using solid propellant (manufactured in Ukraine). Well, each of those 130 missiles of the old type has 100 tonnes of oxidizer that is particularly harmful ecologically (there is an opinion that 1 gram of such oxidizer is sufficient to poison an entire city). In Ukraine, there is still no technology to reprocess it and no capacities or territory to load 6,500 railroad cisterns with this oxidizer. Nor do we have technologies to destroy solid-fuel launch vehicles. For the time being, it is proposed that they be destroyed either with the help of an explosion or by burning them on the stand. The burning of one launch vehicle may leave a large city

without oxygen, and an experimental explosion of a launch tube with a launch vehicle in Siberia has left no hope that life in the area may be restored for about 30 years.

The situation is even more complicated in the case of nuclear warheads. The warheads are manufactured in Russia. All the specialists are also there. Every warhead has its own "godfather" among designer scientists—he and he alone can conduct scheduled work. I think that many people still remember all that hullabaloo during the period of the unilateral declaration of the moratorium on nuclear explosions. All leaders of nuclear powers stated that according to specialists, nuclear weapons cannot exist without nuclear tests. I would like to ask the adherents of the nuclear status: Where are they going to get nuclear equipment to create explosions and where are they going to conduct those explosions? Without technical maintenance, without constant monitoring, without testing the weapons themselves, without nuclear explosion tests, and without services provided by scientific research and design institutes, those warheads will become dangerous by themselves in some five to seven years.

Finally, the following question: In whose hands are these weapons? The United States, France, and Great Britain, which all possess nuclear weapons are countries with established democratic traditions and with well-ordered civil control. There, weapons, including nuclear ones, do serve to maintain stability.

In our country, the processes of democratization are just starting. It is not known whom political winds will blow to the surface tomorrow. Those people who by force of inertia are called democrats have already exhibited orthodox bolshevism. Those leaders who called themselves democrats very quickly contracted the ideology of hawks. How will they behave if the entire democratic world turns its back on them as a result of the unpredictability of their conduct?

The question of canceling the nuclear status could be raised if tactical or operational tactical nuclear weapons had still been stationed on the territory of Ukraine. This class of weapons would have conformed to Ukraine's strategic tasks in terms of the range or power of the charges. Where were M. Porovskyy, S. Khmara, V. Tolubko, and their supporters at that time? These weapons were taken to Russia. Ambitions alone have remained.

I would like to conclude this article with a question. What answer will ordinary people give after they learn what the possession of nuclear weapons involves? What will they say when they look at empty shelves of stores knowing the cost of strategic missiles? What will they say if they find out how many billions [currency unit not specified] must be spent on the elaboration, designing, and implementation of nuclear programs?

### **Defense Ministry Views Draft Accord**

*LD0901165293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 9 Jan 93*

[Text] In their appeals to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, people's deputies have recently been expressing their concern in respect of the contents of a draft agreement between Ukraine and Russia in issues of strategic nuclear weapons. The press service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is authorized to state that the draft agreement, which was sent for consideration from Moscow, is an instance of wishful thinking and is another attempt to give a trial to Ukraine's firmness in the issue of the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory. It is noted in the statement that the Ministry of Defense defends the interests of Ukraine and consistently puts them into practice.

### **Conditions Stated for Ratifying START I**

*LD0601220593 Moscow Radio Rossii in Russian  
2100 GMT 6 Jan 93*

[Text] Boris Tarasyuk, chairman of the Ukrainian National Committee for Questions of Disarmament, has named the conditions for ratification of the START I treaty by the Ukrainian parliament in an interview with GOLOS UKRAINY [Voice of Ukraine] newspaper. They are: first, a guarantee by the nuclear powers of Ukraine's security; second, financial assistance from the United States and other western countries for destroying nuclear weapons; and third, compensation for the nuclear components of missiles which have been or will be removed from Ukrainian territory.

### **Kravchuk Creates Nuclear Policy Commission**

*AU0801152793 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
6 Jan 93 p 6*

["Ukrainian Presidential Edict on the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy" issued in Kiev on 3 January]

[Text] To elaborate scientifically grounded proposals regarding forming the state nuclear policy and mechanisms for its implementation, I decree as follows:

1. To create a Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy subordinated to Ukraine's president.

2. To appoint BARYAKHTAR, Viktor Hryhorovych, as chairman of the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy.

3. The main tasks of the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy are as follows:

-preparation of recommendations for forming the state nuclear policy;

-analysis of drafts of normative acts on questions of utilizing nuclear energy;

-assessment of the conformity of concepts and programs for the development of the nuclear energy complex to international requirements and norms;

-consideration of new design and technical solutions in the sphere of the utilization of nuclear energy, including international projects that are significant for Ukraine and elaboration of corresponding proposals proceeding from them.

4. To approve the composition of the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy in conformity with the supplement.

5. V.G. Baryakhtar must, within one month, submit Regulations on the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy.

L. Kravchuk, president of Ukraine  
Kiev, 3 January 1993

### **Defense Ministry Says All Tactical N-Arms Withdrawn**

*LD0401220193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 4 Jan 93*

[Text] Some news agencies have picked up information circulated by the Ostankino Television Company in Moscow stating that nuclear ammunition assigned to the Black Sea Fleet has only now been withdrawn from military arsenals situated on the territory of Crimea. The press service of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense is authorized to announce that this information does not correspond to reality. All tactical nuclear weapons including those of the Black Sea Fleet were withdrawn beyond the borders of Ukraine within the period announced earlier.

### **Deputy Foreign Minister Calls COCOM 'Discrimination'**

*WS0801133493 Kiev KYIVSKA PRAVDA  
in Ukrainian 8 Dec 92 p 1*

[Article by N. Vasylyuk from the "Big Politics" rubric: "Will Ukraine Trade Arms?"]

[Text] At the end of November, a conference of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls [COCOM] of strategic materials took place in Paris. It dealt with arms trade. The committee was founded in 1950 to ban strategic arms trade with socialist countries. During the "cold war," the West's stance was easy to explain, but today, when principal changes in international relations have taken place, the Coordinating Committee has to revise it.

The forum gathered 17 members, seven observing, and nine invited countries. Among the latter were the states embraced by the committee's ban. It is natural that Ukraine was also invited. Our country was represented by the delegation headed by Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Tarasyuk. He agreed to speak on his

visit at a briefing for Ukrainian and foreign reporters at the press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The members of the Committee discussed guarantees given by arms trading countries. It is envisioned that after considering them, the Committee will abolish the existing limitations. The problem will remain unsolved until 1993, however, when the next session of the Coordinating Committee is convened.

"Ukraine's attitude toward the Committee's activity could be expressed in a few words," said Mr. Tarasyuk: "We regard the ban on strategic materials trade with Ukraine as discrimination".

#### **Black Sea Nuclear-Free Zone Proposed at UN**

*LD0601151193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 2300 GMT 5 Jan 93*

[Text] At a briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine journalists were informed that during a discussion of the issue of disarmament at the 47th session of the UN General Assembly, the Ukrainian delegation advanced a developed concept regarding Ukraine acquiring the status of a nonnuclear state and its position regarding nuclear weapons which are temporarily located on its territory. It was emphasized that the Ukrainian delegation stressed the need for strict international control over the transportation to Russia of strategic nuclear weapons which are to be destroyed. The delegation proposed that the representatives of UN member states should discuss the idea of setting up a zone free from nuclear weapons in the Black Sea region, a zone of peace and cooperation.

#### **Nuclear Charges To Be Converted Into Fuel**

*LD0501231393 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya  
Television Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 5 Jan 93*

[No video available]

[Text] Ukraine will sign all treaties concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but Ukraine does not want to give away all nuclear charges at no cost. Ihor Yukhnovskyy, Ukraine first deputy prime minister, stated this at a news conference for journalists. He said that our atomic power stations have to purchase nuclear fuel each year (?at an amount of nearly) 100 million dollars. Thus Ukraine will endeavor to transform its nuclear charges into fuel for atomic power stations.

#### **Dismissals Follow Nuclear Waste Storage Violations**

*OW0501200993 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1941 GMT 5 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Georgiy Gotovchits, the minister on protection of the population from the consequences of the Chernobyl atomic power station catastrophe, dismissed Boris Kucherenko and Vitaliy Cherednichenko, the director and the chief engineer of the Kiev inter-provincial special plant, "for repeated cruel violations during the storage of nuclear wastes." This information was received by INTERFAX from the press service of the Kiev state administration on Tuesday [5 January].

The plant for the storage of radioactive wastes is situated 5 kilometers from Kiev in the village of Pirogovo along the gliding pattern of the airport Zhulyany. It was built in 1956 and according to several public organizations and independent experts, does not satisfy the security requirements. Gosatomenergondzor, the Ukrainian General Prosecutor, the presidential representative in Kiev, the trade unions, and the party of "the Greens" stand for its closing.



## GERMANY

### Kinkel Hails Signing of CW Convention

LD1301144893 Berlin DDP in German 1232 GMT  
13 Jan 93

[Text] Bonn (DDP)—Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel describes the Chemical Weapons Convention signed today in Paris as a "breakthrough for disarmament." The treaty system is also a milestone for joint efforts to preserve world peace, the minister said at the conference for signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Federal Foreign Ministry in Bonn reports.

The agreement creates a "model for cooperative security at global level," the minister underlined. If it proves itself practice, it could become a better alternative to the trade restrictions previously applied to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. Kinkel called upon all states who had not yet acceded to the treaty to do so without delay.

The minister is resolutely committed to the inclusion of biological weapons in the condemnation of weapons of mass destruction. Germany is playing a significant role in the efforts to equip this agreement with a verification regime.

### Study Conducted on Combatting Nuclear Proliferation

AU1201130893 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
RUNDSCHAU in German 12 Jan 93 p 1

[Report by Edgar Auth: "The Passing on of Nuclear Arms Remains an Insecurity Factor"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 11 January—In the view of peace researchers in Frankfurt, the proliferation of nuclear arms remains a major problem in international security policy. On the occasion of the presentation of their paper "Nuclear Export and Rearmament" on Monday [11 January], Bernd W. Kubbig and Harald Mueller, of the "Hesse Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research" (HSFK), mentioned India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iraq, Libya, and the successor states of the USSR as countries with nuclear arms ambitions.

For Germany, the export policy toward Iran constitutes a "problematic test case." According to Kubbig/Mueller, exports to Iran that require approval have strongly increased. Eighty percent of all these exports are being approved.

"It would be devastating if the FRG were to export one or two nuclear power plants there," Kubbig warned. Tehran is obviously acquiring enough uranium and the capacities for enrichment and reprocessing to be able to build nuclear arms. Its current partners include China and Argentina, among others.

To what extent Germany's new export guidelines, which are assessed as highly positive, can be consistently implemented is the main question for the peace researchers at the moment. The Bundestag has failed to get legal guarantees for control rights. Moreover, it is also unclear whether a

"serious control mentality is already prevailing" in the Federal Export Office. It is also to be feared that the new export list, which was published shortly before Christmas 1992, will again undermine the cautious export policy. The possibility remains that the technical parameter for dual-use goods are defined in a way that such goods would no longer be subject to approval.

The authors warned that German export controls can be avoided also via the new European single market. Member countries with weaker export control systems threaten to become transit points for dual-use goods.

In the experts' view, development aid might be one possibility to curb the poor countries' desire for weapons-grade high technology. Those who build up arms and disrespect human rights should get less. At the same time, the peace researchers warn against a new North-South confrontation. To prevent developing countries from receiving the impression that they are subject to dictates from the North, the peace experts suggest close cooperation. Nuclear supplier countries and leading countries of the poorer world should hold permanent meetings. To contain the proliferation of missile technology, the stick of sanctions must be linked with the carrot of incentives. Industrialized nations can offer cooperation for civilian space projects.

The HSFK staffers welcomed the fact that the FRG does not overestimate the danger. Only a few countries constitute a "long-term and hypothetical" danger to the West through their missiles. In most cases, the arms buildup is taking place because of regional rivalries, as can be seen in the case of India and Pakistan. "Any panacea in terms of military technology," as is currently being developed by the United States, should be rejected. These are changing the "Star Wars" (Strategic Defense Initiative) program, which was developed during the cold war, into an anti-missile scheme against attacks from the South (GPALS).

The researchers' study contains new details about the involvement of the United States in the arms build-up of its current main enemy, Iraq. According to U.S. Congress findings, 13 U.S. companies and not just one, as was hitherto thought, supplied—maybe unwittingly—technology for Baghdad's nuclear arms program. U.S. companies also contributed material for upgrading Soviet Scud missiles, which were used, among other things, to attack U.S. bases. In this connection, the Bush Administration circumvented the closely knit and exemplary U.S. licensing procedures.

To avoid such cases in the future, the HSFK authors propose an international non-proliferation plan. It consists of: an efficient inspection scheme, including unrestricted access rights for inspectors like those in Iraq at the moment—for all states; an early-warning system, which focuses internationally spread information on export approvals and investigations procedures, and satellite monitoring activities; an international agreement on sanctions against "would-be nuclear states" and their accomplices; a strong role for the UN Security Council; and regional armament control and security guarantees for states without nuclear arms.

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